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ABSTRACT
Sikorsky's recently begun program to manufacture the S-76 helicopter airframe at a supplier in
China is examined as a case study of supplier relationship management. Best practices and key
principles from the literature and other industry case studies are identified. Key concepts covered
include: importance of product architecture and supplier strategic role on the appropriate type of
supplier relationship to develop; the different stages of relationship management; the concept of
making investments in a supplier relationship as a way of achieving desired relationship closeness; the
importance of geography and culture on foreign supplier relationships.
The best practices and principles are then used to analyze Sikorsky's performance in the China S-
76 airframe program to date. It is found that while Sikorsky is engaged in several key supplier
relationship management activities, significant improvement could be made by more carefully
considering how to overcome geographic and cultural distance and by making decisions about
relationship investments in a more analytical way, with a focus on bottom-line financial impact. Finally, a
generalized process for managing supplier relationships is developed. The six steps are:
* Determine the appropriate relationship to develop with the supplier
* Determine current supply chain proximity with the supplier
* Determine stage of supplier relationship management and appropriate type of investments
* Develop menu of relationship investment options
* Determine the attractiveness of investment options
* Select, prioritize and make investments
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INTRODUCTION
The author spent the second half of 2008 conducting his Leaders for Manufacturing internship
at Shanghai Sikorsky, Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation's (Sikorsky) joint venture in China, as a member of
their procurement team as they ramped-up production of the airframe of their S-76 helicopter by a
Chinese supplier. One of the internship's major goals was to develop insight for Sikorsky into how it
could better manage its supplier relationships, with a specific focus on its relationship with its Chinese
supplier, Changhe Aircraft Company (Changhe). The method followed was to gather information on
supplier relationship management best practices and principles from the literature and company case
studies while at the same time determining Sikorsky's current state of supplier relationship
management with Changhe through direct observation. The next steps were to utilize frameworks from
the literature to analyze Sikorsky's current performance, develop specific recommendations for
improvement of their relationship with Changhe and develop a generalized process that could be used
to manage other supplier relationships.
CHAPTER 1: CONTEXT & PROBLEM
SIKORSKY COMPANY OVERVIEW
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation ("Sikorsky"), a United Technologies (UTC) company, is a Stratford,
Connecticut-based designer, manufacturer and servicer of military and commercial-use helicopters.
Founded by aerospace pioneer Igor Sikorsky in the early 1900s, the company built the world's first
practical single-main-rotor helicopter in 1939 (Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation), and today is one of the
world's largest helicopter manufacturers with revenues of $5.4B in 2008. Sales have grown an average
of 16% annually since 2002, when revenues were $2.2B. Commercial-related revenue growth has been
particularly strong, up from $70M in 2002 to $1B in 2008, an average of 56% annual growth. Sikorsky
has an approximately two year order backlog as of the end of 2008. (United Technologies Corporation)
Sikorsky traditionally performed most helicopter assembly operations in-house and produced
most airframe components in house as well. Since around the year 2000, however, it has moved to
more outsourcing of both component manufacturing as well as various amounts of assembly for certain
aircraft. Along with the move to outsourced production has a come a push to also offshore work. Until
relatively recently, all of Sikorsky's manufacturing facilities were located in the U.S. and most airframe
components, whether manufactured in-house or outsourced to suppliers, were also fabricated in the
U.S. By the mid-'90s, though, Sikorsky began to expand its manufacturing activity globally.
Today, in addition to five manufacturing locations in the U.S., Sikorsky in total also has wholly-
owned manufacturing facilities in Poland, joint-venture manufacturing facilities in Turkey and China and
major integration suppliers in the Czech Republic and China. Sikorsky also owns service and support
facilities in seven countries outside the U.S. (Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation).
Sikorsky's involvement in China began relatively early, in the mid-'90s, when it selected Changhe
to participate in the design and manufacture of the tail pylon of the S-92 commercial helicopter.
Changhe continues to produce S-92 tail pylons and in 2007 was also chosen to serve as a second-source
supplier for the S-76 helicopter's airframe. Production of S-76 airframes by Changhe began in 2008.
S-76 PRODUCT OVERVIEW
"An intermediate class, twin-engine commercial helicopter, the S-76 helicopter was originally
intended for the offshore and executive marketplaces. The S-76 helicopter program was announced in
February 1975 as the first strictly commercial production program in Sikorsky's history. The first
production aircraft was delivered in February 1979." (Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation) The S-76 is
Sikorsky's best selling commercial aircraft, with current annual deliveries of about 50 units and a lifetime
delivery volume of over 700 aircraft to date. The S-76 sells for between $8M and $12M depending on
equipment and interior options.
Production of an S-76 helicopter happens in five main stages: component manufacture, airframe
assembly, final assembly, completion and testing. Component manufacture is done primarily by
suppliers. In the case of airframe sheet metal and composite components, much of the work is
sometimes done in-house by the supplier who also serves as the airframe assembler. Airframe assembly
includes not only assembling the sheet metal and composite body components that are primarily riveted
together, but also installing most of the avionics, electronics and hydraulic system. Final assembly
involves installing all critical moving components such as the engines, gear box, rotor hub and main and
tail rotor blades. Completion consists of installation of interior components like seating and cosmetic
panels, as well as custom painting of the exterior of the airframe. The final stage, testing, consists of a
series of ground and flight tests that confirm the proper functioning of all the aircraft's systems.
The S-76 was largely manufactured in-house by Sikorsky from its inception 30 years ago until
2002, when it selected Aero Vodochody (Aero) in the Czech Republic as a sole-source supplier to
produce the airframe. Since that time, Aero has produced over 200 S-76 airframes for Sikorsky. (Lake 22)
In 2007, Changhe entered into an agreement with Sikorsky to serve as a second-source supplier for the
S-76 airframe. Airframes produced by both Aero and Changhe are shipped to a Sikorsky facility in the U.S.
for final assembly, completion and testing. Sikorsky pays between $2M and $3M for each airframe from
Aero or Changhe.
The airframe of the S-76 consists of about 4000 different part numbers of various types: sheet
metal structural parts, composite structural parts, rivets, adhesives, electronic components, hydraulic
components, etc. The supply chain for the airframe includes over 200 component suppliers, primarily in
the U.S., with a few dozen European suppliers and a few Asian suppliers.
China's current total civil helicopter fleet numbers only 150 helicopters, of which about two
dozen are S-76s. China is not expected to be a significant market for the S-76 until the government
loosens regulations to allow more private aviation, a change which is expected to occur at some point in
the future.
PROBLEM & METHODOLOGY
Sikorsky's supply chain has undergone several significant changes in the last 10 to 15 years. It
now outsources significantly more work than it previously did. It also now has more complex integration
work done by supplier in some cases, rather than just production of individual components or systems.
Finally, its manufacturing is spread across a wider geographic area, including Asian locations with
cultures that are very different from the U.S./West.
These changes amount to a significant change in, and complexity of, Sikorsky's supply chain.
These types of changes have required the company to address a number of supply chain management
questions. First there is the question of asset ownership - the "make vs. buy," or vertical integration
decision. Answering this question requires analyzing a number of strategic, market and technology
factors such as: the firm's core competencies, internal and supplier capabilities, urgency of capacity and
capability needs, economies of scale and intellectual property protection. (Beckman and Rosenfield 45-
57) For those items for which the decision is "buy" rather than "make," there is the question of where to
buy from (both supplier and geography selection). Answering this question requires performing Total
Landed Cost analyses; assessing geographic-specific and supplier-specific risks; and considering market
access and other strategic factors. Finally, once decisions about what is to be outsourced and where to
source from have been made, companies must answer the question of how to work with, or manage,
their chosen suppliers. This final question of how to manage supplier relationships is the focus of this
paper.
This paper attempts to address what any company can do to manage suppliers more effectively,
but given the specific situation of Sikorsky, focuses on issues particularly relevant to companies that are
undergoing or have undergone the transition from primarily internal manufacturing to increasing
amounts of outsourcing and off-shoring. The supply chain management literature, the culture literature
and industry case studies will be used as sources of principles and best practices. Sikorsky's relationship
with Changhe will be analyzed to serve as a case study of how to apply these principles.
The application case companies, Sikorsky and Changhe, are in the aerospace industry, and many
other aerospace companies are undergoing or have undergone similar evolutions in supply chain
architecture. The application case also deals with an American company souring from a Chinese supplier.
It is important to note, however, that the principles highlighted, analysis conducted and improvements
recommended have applicability in any business operation, regardless of industry or geography. With
that in mind, a generalized process for managing supplier relationships is presented as the final result of
this analysis.
CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTS & PRINCIPLES FROM THE LITERATURE
DEFINING SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIPS
Before examining the topic of supplier relationship management, it is helpful to define what is
meant by supplier relationships in the context of this thesis. Beckman and Rosenfield present a
spectrum of supplier relationships that is defined by ownership of both assets and responsibilities. The
spectrum, arranged according to increasing levels of vertical integration, ranges from "arm's-length
relationships" to "full ownership." (Beckman and Rosenfield 224) (Table 1)
Table 1: Spectrum of Relationships with Suppliers or Customers, Beckman and Rosenfield
Type of Relationship Description
Arm's length relationships * Traditional, cost-based, free-market, short-
duration, purchase-order-driven relationships
Modified vendor relationships * Value-added services (e.g., supplier managed
inventories)
Long-term contracts * Long-term supply contracts
Non-equity-based collaboration * R&D consortia
* Cross-marketing agreements
* Cross-production agreements
* Joint purchasing activities
Minority equity investments * Invest in a supplier
Licensing arrangements * Provide license to supplier in technology that
host firm develops, but in which it wants to limit
investments
Investment integration * Coordinate investment jointly
Joint ventures or strategic alliances * Allow firms to exchange certain goods, services,
information, or expertise while maintaining a
formal trade relationship on others
Asset ownership * Host firm retains ownership for critical assets in
adjacent stages of the industry chain but
contracts out all other aspects of ownership and
control
Full ownership * Host firm fully owns activity
Supplier relationships, however, consist of more than just assets and lists of responsibilities
determined by contracts. Information sharing is another crucial aspect of supplier relationships because
it ultimately is what enables work to occur. People relationships are also a critical component of supplier
relationships because interaction of customer and supplier personnel is required for information to be
exchanged. Interaction between people can be done via a variety of modes (face-to-face conversation,
email, etc.) and in a variety of formats (formal meetings, memos, physical tasks). How much and what
information is shared between customer and supplier as well as how and when information is shared
are all things that in part define the relationship a customer has with its supplier.
For the purposes of this thesis, "supplier relationship" is broadly defined to include all of the
aspects of relationship mentioned above. A reasonable working definition of supplier relationships,
then, might be: "actions and conditions that connect a customer and supplier, including specific
investments, assigned responsibilities, exchange of information and interaction of people, as well as the
norms for, or means of, determining these actions and conditions." Table 2 lists these aspects along with
some examples of how they might be manifested differently in "arm's length" and "close" supplier
relationships.
Table 2: Supplier relationship aspects and examples
Action or condition "Arm's-length" relationship "Close" relationship example
example
Specific investments * No specific investments *One or both parties invest in
custom tooling
Assigned responsibilities * Supplier supplies * Supplier takes responsibility for
* Customer purchases managing sub-tier suppliers
* Customer responsible for
managing design changes
Interaction of people * Purchasing agent interacts via * Customer quality and
email and telephone with engineering staff jointly located
supplier's salesman at supplier
Exchange of information * Purchase order and product * Integration of ERP/MRP
specifications are only shared systems between customer
information and supplier
* Formal, regular progress
meetings
Means of determining * Purchase-order based * Long-term contracts and
relationship aspects incentives
* Face-to-face, multi-round
negotiations
* Informal joint problem-solving
SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
Over the last few decades, supply chain management has grown both in importance and
complexity as companies have realized the strategic and competitive importance of the supply chain and
as industry has trended towards more outsourcing and global sourcing. It is now important to be more
nuanced and sophisticated in architecting the supply chain, and accordingly, supplier relationship
management has also become more complex. Given this increased variety in the type of suppliers and
types of cooperation with suppliers, it may be helpful to utilize some type of theoretical framework to
assess how a company should manage each individual supplier in its supply chain.
One such framework was developed by Moeller et al., and draws from Customer Relationship
Management (CRM) concepts as well as supplier management literature to develop the Supplier
Relationship Management (SRM) framework. SRM seeks to map actions across different types of
suppliers and different stages of supplier relationships. The SRM framework, in part, is derived from
customer-centric CRM principles turned on their heads so as to be supplier-centric:
* The main task of SRM is to optimize the portfolio of suppliers.
* Investments in new supplier relationships can be valuable and necessary.
* New supplier acquisition costs exceed supplier maintenance costs.
* The potential lifetime value of a supplier relationship to the customer varies by supplier, and
relationships should be invested in accordingly. (Moeller, Fassnacht and Klose 69-78)
In the SRM framework, supplier management is divided into three sequential phases:
* Out-Supplier Management
* In-Supplier Management
* In-Supplier Dissolution Management
Out-Supplier Management involves evaluating potential future suppliers as replacements for current
suppliers. Given the high costs of supplier acquisition, a key task in this phase of SRM is assessing
whether the investment in acquiring and developing a new supplier is justified by the potential payoff.
In-Supplier Management consists of "building up and maintaining relationships with [current] suppliers
to enhance value creation." In-Supplier Dissolution Management deals with ending supplier
relationships. (Moeller, Fassnacht and Klose 73)
Given this thesis's focus on analyzing the ongoing supplier relationship Sikorsky has with
Changhe, the "In-Supplier Management" phase is the most relevant to consider. In-Supplier
Management's focus is on building and maintaining relationships with current suppliers, with the
recognition that each supplier must be treated according to its value-enhancing potential. There are
four sub-elements of In-Supplier Management: Set-Up Management, Development Management,
Contract Management and Disturbance Management. (Moeller, Fassnacht and Klose 75-76) Figure 1
illustrates both the phases of Supplier Relationship management and the sub-elements of In-Supplier
Management.
Set-Up Management argues that, as with CRM, the costs of acquiring new suppliers are greater
than the costs of maintaining them, but that these investments can be "valuable and necessary."
(Moeller, Fassnacht and Klose 76) It involves making investments by both the customer and supplier,
especially ones that are valuable only in the context of the specific customer-supplier relationship. These
"specific" investments serve to enhance the capabilities of the supplier as well as build trust and signal
commitment by both parties. Moeller et al. cite a study by Jap and Ganesan (2000) where they conclude
that "specific investments especially in the set up phase are a powerful signal for relationship
commitment. The signal provides confidence for the partners, because each will sustain economic
consequences in case of relationship termination..." The level of investment made by the customer
depends on how strategic, or value-enhancing, the supplier is expected to be. (Moeller, Fassnacht and
Klose 76-77)
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Figure 1: The Supplier Relationship Life Cycle and Corresponding Management Tasks (Moeller et al.)
Development Management consists of identifying opportunities for improvement and
undertaking activities to capture those opportunities. As in Set-Up Management, these activities may
involve making more specific investments. But during this phase it is important to balance the cost of
improvement with the expected lifetime value of the supplier relationship. Moeller presents a matrix for
mapping suppliers' potential value as a combination of their strategic importance and relationship
contribution (Figure 2). Suppliers that have a high strategic importance and high relationship
contribution are labeled as "Real Value Enhancers," and deemed worthy of higher levels of
Development Management effort than other suppliers. (Moeller, Fassnacht and Klose 79-80)
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Figure 2: Managing the Supplier Portfolio within SRM (Moeller et al.)
Contract Management is a sub-element of In-Supplier Management used with those suppliers
deemed unworthy of significant Development Management or specific investments. Relationships with
these suppliers are managed primarily through contracts. (Moeller, Fassnacht and Klose 80)
The final sub-element of In-Supplier Management, Disturbance Management, involves
preventing "breakdown of continuous relationships...The identification of potentially problematic
aspects within the relationship allows the proactive and careful management of these disturbance
aspects and an early employment of de-escalation instruments like cooperative meetings or
renegotiation of contract conditions." (Moeller, Fassnacht and Klose 81)
STRATEGIC ROLES OF FACTORIES
Per Moeller et al., knowing what kind of relationship to pursue with a given supplier is
contingent upon the expected strategic value of that supplier. One way to go about determining the
expected strategic value of a supplier is for the customer to think about the supplier's factory as part of
its own factory network, and consider what strategic role it should play within that network.
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Ferdows defines six potential strategic roles that a foreign factory can play. These six strategic
roles represent a kind of continuum from low strategic value where the objective is cost minimization,
to high strategic value, where the goal is access to markets and exploitation of global knowledge and
talent. The type of capital and managerial investments made vary according to strategic role. These six
strategic roles and corresponding investments are summarized in Table 3. To categorize a factory, "start
by answering two basic questions...What is the primary strategic reason for the factory's location? What
is the scope of its current activities?" (Ferdows 76-77)
Table 3: Strategic Roles of Foreign Factories
Factory Type Factory's Strategic Role Required Investments
Offshore factory * Access to low factor costs * Minimum level of investment
* Manufacture for export
* Little or no product development work
* Little or no supply chain management
Source factory * Access to low factor costs * Supply chain management skills
* Manufacture for export * Low level of product engineering
* Supply chain management skills & resources
* Product modification
Server factory * Access to local markets * Low level of product engineering
* Limited product modification skills & resources
Contributor factory * Access to local markets * Skilled engineering and
* Product and process development management talent & resources
* Supply chain management * Supply chain management skills
Outpost factory * Gather strategic lead market information * Market intelligence gathering
* Secondary role as another type of factory skills & resources
* Skills required for secondary role
Lead factory * Development of products and process for * High level of management skills
company globally * High level of engineering skills &
* Gathers and exploits market information resources
* Customer interface * High level of sales and CRM skills
& resources
In Table 3, factory roles are listed in order of increasing strategic importance. Higher strategic
importance corresponds with higher necessary levels of investment in the supplier relationship. In the
case of an internally-owned factory, the source of investment is obvious. In the case of a supplier, the
customer's decisions about investments can be less clear. If a supplier already possesses the necessary
skills and resources to perform the strategic role required by the customer, difficult decisions about
investments may not be necessary. But in the case where a supplier's skill and resource base requires
upgrading in order to be able to fulfill the strategic role desired by the customer, decisions must be
made about which party will make which investments. According to Moeller et al., the higher the
strategic value of a supplier, the greater the need for shared, mutual specific investments. (Moeller,
Fassnacht and Klose 76-77)
The strategic role desired of a supplier's factory has at least three implications for supplier
relationship management. First, the greater the strategic role required of the supplier, the greater the
complexity of interaction required between the supplier and customer, which in turn necessitates
development of a closer relationship with the supplier. Second, the greater amount of investment
required to enable a supplier to fulfill the desired strategic role for the customer, the greater the need
for relationships capable of making joint decisions about responsibility for each specific investment. And
the investments themselves are part of the relationship. Third, necessary investments may be of a tacit
nature - technical or managerial skills, for example - and therefore require close interaction between
customer and supplier personnel in order to successfully "invest" in the supplier.
SUPPLY CHAIN ARCHITECTURE
Supplier relationships are one aspect of supply chain architecture, and so it is important to
understand the concept of supply chain architecture to understand how managing supplier relationships
can be used to achieve optimal supply chain architecture. Optimal supply chain architecture, in turn, is
dependent on product architecture, and so the concept of product architecture must also be
understood and considered when determining supplier relationships.
Architecture is a term most frequently associated with the design of buildings. But more
generally, architecture can be defined as "formation or construction resulting from or as if from a
conscious act;" or "a unifying or coherent form or structure." ( Merriam-Webster, Incorporated)
Anything then, whether an object, system or even an idea that exhibits some coherence or existence of
structure has architecture, whether by accident or by design; hence the use of terms like "computer
architecture," "network architecture," and "organizational architecture."
Product Architecture
Manufactured products thus, by their very nature, must have architecture. Ulrich defines
product architecture as "the scheme by which the function of a product is allocated to its constituent
components." (C. H. Fine, Clockspeed 134) Determination of product architecture is a major outcome of
product design, and involves addressing the following questions:
* "What sub-functions are needed to carry out each function or sub-function?
* What technology will be used to implement each function or sub-function?
* How should each physical embodiment be divided into chunks (also called modules)
within the constraints imposed by choice of technology?
* How should the chunks be arranged with respect to each other in space?
* How will they need to interact?
How should the interfaces that provide these interactions be defined and implemented?"
(Whitney 342)
Supply Chain Architecture
Supply chains, too, have architecture. Supply chain architecture is "a richer concept than that of
traditional make/buy or vertical integration," (C. H. Fine, Clockspeed 136) and consists of addressing,
among others, the following questions:
* Which components should be bought and which made in-house?
* How many sources should each component be supplied by?
* Who owns inventory in each part of the chain?
* When and how much inventory is needed?
* What geographies should production occur in?
* How should the different parties in the supply chain interact and collaborate?
Supply chain design is the conscious process of deciding on supply chain architecture. Fine
defines supply chain design and emphasizes its importance to the manufacturing firm this way:
"Supply chain design ought to be thought of as assembling chains of capabilities, not just
collaborating organizations, in the quest for a series of temporary advantages. Since no advantage lasts
forever, these design activities must be ongoing and therefore constitute the 'core' capability of a firm in
a dynamic economy. "(C. H. Fine, Clockspeed 76)
Modularity and Integrality
One attribute of architecture that is highly relevant to discussions of both product and supply
chain architecture is "the degree to which functional elements are intended to be independent of each
other, and similarly the degree to which physical chunks are designed to be independent of each other
as they carry out their assigned functions." At the independent extreme, referred to as modular
architecture, "each function and sub-function [is] assigned to its own individual...element...Each element
could be designed and manufactured independently of all the others, and the product could be
produced simply by plugging these elements together at their predefined interfaces." At the
interdependent extreme, referred to as integrated architecture, a product "would have a single part that
performs all the functions." That is, all features and functions of architecture would be integrated into a
single component. Most architectures lie somewhere in between the two extremes of modularity and
integrality. (Whitney 345)
Product architecture and integrality
Applied to product architecture, the concept of modularity and integrality refers to a product's
individual components and sub-assemblies, and their interactions with each other. "An integral product
architecture might feature, for example,
* Components that perform many functions
* Components that are in close proximity or close spatial relationship
* Components that are tightly synchronized
In contrast, a modular architecture features separation among a system's constituent parts, whereby
* Components are interchangeable
* Components are individually upgradeable
* Component interfaces are standardized
* System failures can be localized." (C. H. Fine, Clockspeed 134-5)
Looking at the S-76 helicopter airframe as an example can be illustrative (Figure 3). Consider
first the Fuel Cell. This sub-assembly serves as the aircraft's fuel tank as well as providing a portion of the
airframe's structural strength and aerodynamic outer surface. Consider also the Upper Cabin Assembly.
This subassembly serves both as a structural component and aerodynamic component, but also houses
portions of wire harnesses and hydraulic systems and provides volume for passenger seating. Analysis of
many of the remaining sub-assemblies of the S-76 airframe would yield similar results. Many of the
airframe's sub-systems are custom-designed and have custom interfaces with other components. The
fact that the total weight of all the helicopter's components is a critical design requirement is also a
characteristic of integral product architecture. (C. H. Fine, Clockspeed 135) At the airframe level of
assembly or higher, one must conclude that a helicopter has a highly-integrated product architecture.
By contrast, printed circuit boards, consisting of a board with standardized holes mated with
"pluggable" resistors, capacitors and other standard components (Whitney 346); or bicycles, with uni-
functional, interchangeable components exhibit more modular product architecture. (C. H. Fine,
Clockspeed 136)
Figure 3: Product architecture example - Sikorsky S-76 airframe
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Putting it all together: architecture, integrality and supplier relationship management
Supply chain architectures also have characteristics of modularity or integrality. In his book
"Clockspeed," Fine introduces the concept of using "proximity among its elements" as a measure of
supply chain integrality, where proximity is measured along four dimensions: geographic, organizational,
cultural and electronic. (C. H. Fine, Clockspeed) A depiction of this framework can be seen in Figure 4.
The four dimensions can be described as follows:
* Geographic: actual physical distance, although electronic means of communication can in some
cases serve as a form of geographic proximity even when physical separation might be large.
* Organizational: "can be approximated by constructs of ownership, managerial control, and
interpersonal and inter-team dependencies." (C. H. Fine, Clockspeed 137)
* Cultural: language, ethics, business and management norms, relational norms, risk and
uncertainty avoidance, etc.
* Electronic: communication technologies, design software, ERP/MRP systems, etc.
"A supply chain with a high degree of integrality, therefore, is one in which a manufacturer and its
principal suppliers are concentrated in one city or geographic region, have common or interlocking
ownership, share a common business and social culture and are linked electronically." (C. H. Fine,
Clockspeed 138)
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Figure 4: Supply chain proximity framework depiction
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Deriving implications for supplier relationship management from the concepts of architecture
and integrality/modularity first requires understanding that,
"To a significant degree, product and supply chain architectures tend to be aligned along the
integrality-modularity spectrum. That is, integral products tend to be developed and built by
integral supply chains, whereas modular products tend to be designed and built by modular
supply chains. In essence, product and supply chain architectures tend to be mutually
reinforcing." (C. H. Fine, Clockspeed 140)
The logical extension of the mutually reinforcing nature of product and supply chain
architectures is that the supply chain architecture best-suited to deliver a particular product closely
mirrors the product's architecture in its degree of integrality. That is, a product with highly integrated
product architecture is best-delivered by a highly-integrated supply chain.
Where each of the four dimensions of supply chain proximity "rank" in "closeness" is directly a
result of the type of supplier relationships that exist. For example, a customer that requires a supplier to
use the same CAD design software it uses internally, provides visibility into its inventory by linking of ERP
systems and hosts frequent video or teleconferences is managing its supplier relationship such that it
results in close proximity along the electronic dimension of supply chain proximity.
How a company chooses to manage its supplier relationships determines the integrality of a
company's supply chain architecture. And since the supply chain architecture it seeks to construct
should be driven by the architecture of the product it is trying to deliver via the supply chain, it is
important to consider product architecture when managing supplier relationships.
GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY: THE EFFECT OF PHYSICAL SEPARATION ON COMMUNICATION
The geographic dimension of supply chain proximity is largely determined by the distance of
physical separation between two companies' people and facilities. Normal intuition is that "the closer,
the better" when it comes to the appropriate physical distance separating collaborators; the idea being
that closer physical proximity will result in better and more frequent communication. But just how close
is "close enough," or at least sufficient, for effective collaboration is important for organizations with
multiple locations and external suppliers to consider. One way to quantify the relationship is to look at
the affect of physical separation on likelihood of communication.
Frequency of communication versus physical separation
Research on this subject was pioneered by MIT's Thomas Allen in the 1970s as he studied the
effect of organizational architecture on innovation. In his research, Allen and his colleagues plotted the
physical distance between offices in an organization and then assessed whether each pair of individuals
communicated on technical matters at least once a week. Data was collected for multiple organizations
and plotted. "Plotting these results produces a curve that to no one's surprise shows probability of
communication declining with distance." In one set of data collected from seven laboratories,
"communication probability declines to an asymptotic level within the first 50 meters of
separation...Computations were made for pairings in which the distance is much greater, including
distances between sites in hundreds or even thousands of kilometers. The results are unchanged. There
is only a modest drop in probability after the first 50 meters." (Allen 26) Figure 5 below is a plot of this
data.
0O
A. 0.05 o
0 20 40 60 80 100
Separation Distance (Meters)
Figure 5: Probability of Technical Communication as a Function of
Distance Between Work Stations (Allen)
One reaction to this data might be to assume that the data merely reflects an efficient
placement of workers by their managers; that people who need to communicate frequently with each
other have been seated more closely together by their managers than those who don't need to
communicate frequently. To test for this dependency, Allen looked specifically at pairs of
communicators who were members of the same department or the same team. He found that the plot
of communication probability versus separation distance retained the same shape, although with an
upward shift that remained constant with respect to separation distance. (Allen 27)
The clear implication of this phenomenon with respect to the Supply Chain Proximity framework
is that very "close" geographic proximity might need to be measured on the order of meters rather than
kilometers; and minutes of travel rather than hours.
Telecommunication frequency versus separation distance
Perhaps counter-intuitively, this same relationship holds even for telephone and email
communication. Allen cites numerous studies indicating that most telephone calls are made to people
with close physical proximity, and that probability of face-to-face communication and electronic
communication tends to be the same. There are a number of reasons why this may be the case:
* Communication frequency in general is naturally inversely correlated with separation distance.
People just communicate more frequently with those nearby than those faraway.
* Communication of complex information often needs to be done through multiple mediums,
such as a combination of drawings, gestures and words.
* Written communication (i.e., email) is asynchronous, leading to time delays versus verbal
communication.
* The necessity of scheduling teleconferences and videoconferences means that they are
primarily used only for communicating formal information. (Allen 30)
Allen also cautions managers not to generalize from their experience to the work of their engineers.
He argues that managers typically communicate much less complex information than do engineers, and
therefore may benefit less from face-to-face interaction with their counterparts than do engineers or
others communicating complex information. (Allen 32) While managers certainly communicate complex
information, it is more of an organizational nature rather than a technical nature, and this may be what
Allen was getting at: managers should refrain from assuming the tools and means of communication
they employ for the type of communication they engage in are also the best fit for their engineers.
Information types and proximity
When assessing the importance of physical proximity amongst collaborators, it is important also
to consider the type of communication that needs to occur. Allen defines three types of technical
communication, the communication of which are affected to varying degrees by physical separation
(Table 4). (Allen 23-24, 39)
Table 4: Types of communication and vulnerability to separation distance
Classification Description Vulnerability to
separation distance
Type I Communication to coordinate the work. (Coordination) Least vulnerable
Type II Communication to maintain staff knowledge of new Moderately
developments in their areas of specialization. (Information) vulnerable
Type III Communication to promote creativity. (Inspiration) Most vulnerable
The takeaway here is that acceptable physical separation distance between communicating
pairs might vary by the content of their work. Engineers collaborating on new designs would have a
smaller maximum acceptable separation distance than would a project manager and his counterpart at
a supplier, for instance.
Separation distance in cross-cultural environments
For companies engaged in international collaboration, it is also important to consider the
implications of cross-cultural situations for the importance of physical proximity. First, it is important to
recognize that cultures vary in the value they place on "face-time" and the value they place on
relationships with business or work partners. Allen states that the same communication probability
drop-off with separation distance occurs in Europe although no data for Asia is cited. (Allen 27) In China,
for instance, the development of individual relationships is more critical to successful business
collaboration than in the U.S. This might mean that U.S. companies might have to locate their teams
that are collaborating with Chinese teams physically closer together than they have to when working
with U.S. partners.
Second, it is important to realize the elevated importance of non-verbal, non-written
communication when dealing with language barriers. For example, even though suppliers in China may
have English translators or speak English themselves, they are communicating in a second language
when using English and will often have difficulty both fully expressing what they wish to communicate
and fully comprehending what is being communicated to them. In these types of situations, being able
to rely on gestures, sketches and viewing of the physical objects being discussed greatly enhances
communication efficiency and accuracy. Face-to-face communication also allows the individual with a
trained eye to assess from non-verbal cues whether he is really being understood or whether a "Yes"
actually means "I don't understand, but I'm embarrassed to admit it," or similar.
Third, it is important to realize the fact that in some cultures where the concept of "face" is
strong, East Asia among them, bad news, dissatisfaction and disagreement tend to be communicated
very indirectly in order to prevent "loss of face" by one or both parties. In fact, unpleasant news (e.g.,
about production delays or quality problems) is often hidden and not communicated at all until
discovered by the other party. Individuals with cross-cultural experience can become sawy detectors of
this type of indirect communication by reading body language, assessing tone of voice and speech
patterns, talking with multiple individuals about the same topic, visiting the worksite for direct
observation or conducting communication in non-threatening social environments. In fact, in East Asia,
it is not uncommon for some of the most frank business discussions to occur under the influence of
alcohol! But when relying on remote communication (telephone & email), one must rely on explicit
words only to try and ascertain the true and full meaning of what is being communicated. This may work
well for communication with Germans, but is not as ideal for communicating with Chinese people.
CULTURAL PROXIMITY: ASSESSING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
The Supply Chain Proximity framework discussed above includes culture as one of the four
dimensions of supply chain proximity. Culture itself is determined by multiple factors, and assessing the
proximity of a customer with its suppliers along this dimension of supply chain proximity requires
analysis of the various factors. Not only is geographic location, or "nationality," a determinant of culture,
but so are home market characteristics and the individual experiences of firms.
Analyzing how a supplier's culture differs from the customer's can give the organizations insight into
how best adapt their inter-company interactions to more closely match that of each other or at least
take into account cultural differences, resulting in closer proximity along the culture axis of supply chain
proximity. This is most important when an integral supply-chain architecture is indicated by the
integrated nature of the products being produced by the supplier for the customer.
Nationality and culture
Dr. Geert Hofstede of The Netherlands conducted what is widely considered to be the seminal
research on the topic of ethnicity-based cultural differences, beginning as a psychologist working for
IBM in the 1960's and 1970's, and continuing for several decades afterward. Hofstede identified five
dimensions of "national cultural difference," summarized below:
1. "Power distance, that is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and
institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. This
represents inequality (more versus less), but defined from below, not from above. It suggests
that a society's level of inequality is endorsed by the followers as much as by the leaders. Power
and inequality, of course, are extremely fundamental facts of any society and anybody with
some international experience will be aware that 'all societies are unequal, but some are more
unequal than others.'
2. Individualism on the one side versus its opposite, collectivism, that is the degree to which
individuals are integrated into groups. On the individualist side we find societies in which the
ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her
immediate family. On the collectivist side, we find societies in which people from birth onwards
are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, often extended families (with uncles, aunts and
grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. The word
'collectivism' in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group, not to the state. Again,
the issue addressed by this dimension is an extremely fundamental one, regarding all societies
in the world.
3. Masculinity versus its opposite, femininity, refers to the distribution of roles between the
genders which is another fundamental issue for any society to which a range of solutions are
found. The IBM studies revealed that (a) women's values differ less among societies than men's
values; (b) men's values from one country to another contain a dimension from very assertive
and competitive and maximally different from women's values on the one side, to modest and
caring and similar to women's values on the other. The assertive pole has been called
'masculine' and the modest, caring pole 'feminine'. The women in feminine countries have the
same modest, caring values as the men; in the masculine countries they are somewhat assertive
and competitive, but not as much as the men, so that these countries show a gap between
men's values and women's values.
4. Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity; it
ultimately refers to man's search for Truth. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its
members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. Unstructured
situations are novel, unknown, surprising, different from usual. Uncertainty-avoiding cultures try
to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules, safety and security
measures, and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute Truth; 'there can
only be one Truth and we have it'. People in uncertainty-avoiding countries are also more
emotional, and motivated by inner nervous energy. The opposite type, uncertainty-accepting
cultures, are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to; they try to have as
few rules as possible, and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow
many currents to flow side by side. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and
contemplative, and not expected by their environment to express emotions.
5. Long-term versus short-term orientation: Values associated with Long Term Orientation are
thrift and perseverance; values associated with Short Term Orientation are respect for tradition,
fulfilling social obligations, and protecting one's 'face'. Both the positively and the negatively
rated values of this dimension are found in the teachings of Confucius, the most influential
Chinese philosopher who lived around 500 B.C.; however, the dimension also applies to
countries without a Confucian heritage." (Hofstede)
Through the various studies performed by Hofstede over the years, many countries have been
assigned relative scores on each dimension which allow for a direct comparison of these aspects of
national culture. These dimensions, of course, need to be interpreted in the context of business and
organizations to be useful in the task of supply chain architecting. Table 5 contains a summary of some
of the business and organizational implications of cultural attributes taken from Schneider and Barsoux's
book "Managing Across Cultures." (Schneider and Barsoux)
Home market characteristics and culture
The characteristics of a particular market also influence the culture of organizations based there.
Here, important factors include the structure of an economy (free market vs. centrally-controlled),
economic and market growth rates, labor demographics (age and other characteristics of the workforce),
level of competition in the local market and local consumer tastes.
To the extent that any of these factors differ between a supplier's and customer's home
markets, the firms should consider how these differences might indicate cultural differences that will
have to be overcome. For example, location in a centrally-controlled economy might be reflected in an
organization's culture in the form of a weaker profit-orientation in decision making and slowness to
innovate compared to firms located in free markets. In a market where consumers are highly price-
conscious, firms will be more strongly focused on cost control in manufacturing, whereas in a market
where consumers are highly quality-conscious, firms may be more focused on quality control.
It is important, too, to realize that there is a time dimension to market characteristics that may
affect firms of different nationalities differently. For example, because of their strong long-term
orientation, Chinese firms' cultures might be more strongly affected by long-term rather than short-
term market outlooks.
Table 5: Example Business and Organizational Implications of Cultural Attributes
National Culture Attribute Business/Organization implications
Power Distance = High * More levels of hierarchy
* Higher proportion of supervisory personnel
* More centralized decision making
Uncertainty Avoidance = High * Greater amount of written rules and procedures
* Greater specialization in technical competence
* Managers avoid taking risks
* Managers motivated by stability and security
Collectivist Orientation = High * Preference for group decision making
* Consensus and cooperation valued more highly
than individual initiative and effort
* Motivation derived from a sense of belonging
* Leaders must facilitate team effort and
integration
Masculinity = High * More concerned with task accomplishment than
nurturing social relationships
* Leaders more focused on ensuring bottom-line
profits
Long Term Orientation = High * Building up strong market position is more
important than immediate results (profits)
* Acceptance of hierarchical roles
* Persistence in work
Firm experiences and culture
Beyond ethnicity and market characteristics, a firm's unique experiences also affect its culture.
In the case of a customer preparing to work with a foreign supplier in an emerging market, it is
especially important to consider what other experience the supplier has had with foreign customers and
how that will affect its culture in ways that might make it easier or more difficult to partner with. Firms
that feel they have been "burned" or taken advantage of by foreign customers might be more cautious
when partnering with foreign customers in the future.
CHAPTER 3: BEST PRACTICE CASE EXAMPLES
In order to illustrate what successful supplier relationship management looks like, two case
examples are presented below. Toyota is widely considered to be best-in-class in the automotive
industry in the area of supplier development and management. Cisco has a fully outsourced supply chain
(for most product lines) and has done extensive work in integrating with suppliers in the area of IT. Both
cases will be used to illustrate proximity along all four dimensions of supply chain proximity, but with
different emphases. The Toyota example highlights the geographic dimension more strongly, and the
Cisco example highlights the electronic dimension more strongly.
TOYOTA
Toyota's products, automobiles, probably fall somewhere in the middle of the spectrum of
modular versus integral product architecture. Some automobile components and systems do serve
multiple-purposes, but the interfaces between components and systems are governed by at least some
level of standardization. However, most components are not off-the-shelf items, but rather custom-
designed for a specific vehicle. Additionally, overall vehicle performance (fuel economy, handling, etc.) is
a function of many or all components. Integrated product architecture indicates a need for an integrated
supply chain architecture, and Toyota has just that with much of its supply base. In fact, it could be
argued that the integrality of Toyota's supply chain exceeds that which might be necessary to deliver its
products. However, Toyota's process architecture, defined largely by Lean and Just-In-Time
manufacturing (JIT), is highly integral in nature. In a manufacturing system with low levels of raw
material and WIP inventory, each successive step in the manufacturing process is highly dependent on
preceding steps (i.e., can become starved quickly if there are problems upstream), including those
performed by external suppliers. This integral process architecture demands a high level of integrality of
the supply chain, to enable more rapid communication of information and problem solving that are
necessary to support Lean and JIT.
It is interesting to note that from the literature reviewed, it is unclear whether Toyota's supply
chain architecture decisions, and therefore its supplier relationships, are motivated by improving
Toyota's performance or by more egalitarian goals. In fact, Toyota has a purchasing philosophy dating
back to 1939 that specifically states, "once nominated as Toyota suppliers, they should be treated a part
of Toyota (as branch plants); Toyota shall carry out business with these suppliers without switching to
others, and shall make every effort to raise the performance of these suppliers." (Sako 286) Whatever
the case, Toyota has chosen to build a supply chain that is more integral than that of many other auto
makers. Liker and Meier describe it thusly:
Supplier examples "tell a story of interlocking structures with supplier partners. It is more like a
marriage than casual dating. Technical systems, social systems, and cultural systems are all
tightly intertwined. It goes beyond manufacturing to product development systems. It is not
enough to be a good supplier. The supplier must act as a seamless extension of the refined lean
systems of Toyota." (Liker and Meier, The Toyota Way Fieldbook 279)
The Supply Chain Proximity framework is a useful tool for demonstrating the integrality of the
supply chain between Toyota and its suppliers. Along the Geographic dimension of supply chain
proximity, Toyota tends to have close proximity with its suppliers. In Japan, most of Toyota's suppliers'
factories are located in very close proximity to Toyota's base of production in Nagoya. So many Toyota
and Toyota supplier factories are located there that it is known as "Toyota City." Even outside of Japan,
Toyota seeks to develop local sources for components in the markets where it assembles automobiles,
although geographic proximity may not be as close as with its operations in Japan. This close geographic
proximity helps support Toyota's reliance on a JIT manufacturing model by minimizing transportation
time of inventory from suppliers' factories to Toyota assembly plants.
But close geographic proximity of factories serves an equally important function of making it
easier for Toyota personnel to visit, observe and work with suppliers' personnel, and vice-versa. This
two-way, face-to-face interaction and cooperation between Toyota and supplier personnel is, in fact,
the other significant feature of Toyota's supply chain integrality along the geographic dimension. It
reflects Toyota's "core philosophy of going and seeing directly, to deeply understand the situation"
(Liker and Meier 275) and is codified in the term genchi genbutsu (actual part, actual place).
Toyota's Operations Management Consulting Division (OMCD) is tasked not only with
implementing the Toyota Production System (TPS) in Toyota's own factories, but also at suppliers'
factories. They deploy teams to supplier's facilities, staffed with the exact same engineers responsible
for TPS implementation within Toyota, rather than with engineers focused only on external suppliers.
Toyota also extends this teaching interaction to supplier-supplier interactions in the form of jishuken, or
study groups. In jishuken, several Toyota suppliers meet together to engage in knowledge-sharing and
joint problem-solving, and even conduct kaizen activities together in each other's factories. (Sako 287-
288)
Toyota's interaction with suppliers does not end with sending Toyota personnel to work at
suppliers' facilities. It also includes bringing suppliers' engineers to Toyota to work. When Toyota started
working with the Mexican supplier Metalsa, "Toyota asked that a large team of engineers be dedicated
to the project and that they spend significant time in Japan. They asked for a full-time engineer to be
stationed in Michigan near the Toyota Technical Center (TTC), and for one and later two more engineers
to be stationed full-time in Japan to work alongside Toyota engineers." (Liker and Meier 275-277)
Along the Organizational dimension of supply chain proximity, Toyota also displays
characteristics of close proximity with its suppliers in some cases. Japanese industry is famous for its
kieretsu, or conglomerates, that consist of companies with extensive equity cross-holdings. In Japan,
Toyota holds equity in many of its suppliers, creating a high degree of organizational proximity. (C. H.
Fine, Clockspeed 38) Even in foreign markets, Toyota will sometimes form joint ventures with suppliers.
In Kentucky, for example, Toyota arranged for Johnson Controls to form a JV with a Japanese supplier,
Araco, in which Toyota was the majority shareholder, to be the second-source for seats to supply to
Toyota's Georgetown, KY assembly plant. Interestingly enough, Johnson Control's own wholly-owned
operation was already the first source for these seats. (Liker and Meier, The Toyota Way Fieldbook 278-
279)
Toyota's OMCD organization, however, also represents a form of organizational proximity.
OMCD works both with Toyota internally and with external suppliers, and uses the same personnel for
both types of projects. (Sako 287-288) Its supplierjishuken help foster the same sort of organizational
proximity between the various members of its supply base.
Along the Cultural dimension, specific information regarding national cultural adaptation or
localization of management talent was not found. However, TPS is certainly a strong component of
Toyota culture, and Toyota's intense work to develop and improve suppliers is, in fact, work to diffuse
Toyota's TPS culture into its supply base, thereby creating close cultural proximity. Jeffrey Liker, a
notable scholar of Toyota, often uses values-laden terms to describe how Toyota works with it suppliers.
In "The Toyota Way Fieldbook," regarding this, he states, "The key word is 'parent.' It implies leadership
and long-term relationship. It connotes trust, caring, and mutual well-being, yet also signifies discipline,
being challenged, and improvement." Such descriptions lend credence to the notion that Toyota's
efforts at supplier development are beyond short-term transactional in nature and are aimed at deeper,
cultural development.
Finally, along the electronic dimension, Toyota also exhibits some characteristics of close supply
chain proximity. It has close integration with suppliers' MRP systems, allowing it to monitor production
performance real-time. This ensures that Toyota learns of supplier problems and can engage the
supplier in problem-solving quickly, a critical capability for its JIT manufacturing system. (Liker and Meier,
The Toyota Way Fieldbook 280)
Liker and Thomas Choi present what they term "The Supplier-Partnering Hierarchy," a six-step
framework which summarizes both Toyota's and Honda's supplier partnering models (Figure 6). Both
companies engage in each of the six steps, but the hierarchical nature of the framework indicates which
steps are dependent on previous steps. In the list below, subsequent steps are dependent on the
previous steps:
1. Understand how your suppliers work
a. Learn about supplier's businesses
b. Go see how suppliers work
c. Respect suppliers' capabilities
d. Commit to co-prosperity
2. Turn supplier rivalry into opportunity
a. Source each component from two or three vendors
b. Create compatible production philosophies and systems
c. Set up joint ventures with existing suppliers to transfer knowledge and maintain control
3. Supervise your suppliers
a. Send monthly report cards to core suppliers
b. Provide immediate and constant feedback
c. Get senior managers involved in solving problems
4. Develop suppliers' technical capabilities
a. Build suppliers' problem-solving skills
b. Develop a common lexicon
c. Hone core suppliers' innovation capabilities
5. Share information intensively but selectively
a. Set specific times, places and agendas for meetings
b. Use rigid formats for sharing information
c. Insist on accurate data collection
d. Share information in a structured fashion
6. Conduct joint improvement activities
a. Exchange best practices with suppliers
b. Initiate kaizen projects at suppliers' facilities
c. Set up supplier study groups
Figure 6: Toyota's & Honda's Supplier-Partnering Hierarchy
Mapping these practices to the Supply Chain Proximity framework confirms that Toyota works
to develop close proximity along all four dimensions of supply chain proximity, as illustrated in Table 6.
Table 6: Mapping of Toyota Supplier-partnering practices to Supply Chain Proximity framework
Toyota Supplier-Partnering Practices Relevant Supply Chain Proximity Dimension(s)
Conduct joint improvement activities * Geographic
* Cultural
* Organizational
Share information intensively but selectively * Electronic (potentially)
Develop suppliers' technical capabilities * Geographic
Supervise your suppliers * Geographic
* Electronic
Turn supplier rivalry into opportunity * Organizational
Understand how your suppliers work * Geographic
* Cultural
CISCO
Cisco is well known today for its completely outsourced supply chain model for manufacturing.
But early in the company's life, Cisco did significant manufacturing in-house. It was over the course of 15
years or so that the company transformed its manufacturing from an in-house model to a fully-
outsourced model. Even today, Cisco continues to refine and evolve its supply chain management
practices. Along the way, several dimensions of supply chain proximity have seen significant changes.
Cisco is a good example of dynamic management of supplier relationships in the face of changing
operations strategy and evolving technology.
Until two or three years ago, Cisco maintained extremely close proximity with suppliers along
the electronic and organizational dimensions of supply chain architecture. In most cases, it purchased
and owned the component inventory that was held at and used by its contract manufacturers (CMs).
Cisco also placed terminals for its own Oracle MRP system on the factory floor of its Tier 1 CMs. Among
other things, Cisco's MRP system generated forecasts which dictated CMs' production schedules and
volumes and also housed all bill of materials (BOM) information. Under this scheme, Tier 1 CMs served
primarily as manufacturing capacity only. Supply chain management and assets (inventory, MRP system)
were owned by Cisco, hence close organizational proximity. Exchange of data electronically was all
performed on Cisco's own MRP system, hence close electronic proximity.
In 2006, however, Cisco began undertaking a lean initiative which has resulted in significant
transformation in how it interacts with its Tier 1 CMs. (Cisco) Although Cisco still dictates sources and
prices of components to its Tier Is, the Tier is do the actual component purchasing and own the
inventory. Because they own the inventory, Cisco now allows them to manage it using their own internal
MRP systems rather than Cisco's. There is still significant electronic data exchange and transparency
between the firms, however, through a B2B exchange system. First, Cisco provides monthly and weekly
forecasts to the CMs to guide their ordering of components. Second, Cisco provides a demand, or build,
signal directing actual production schedules and volumes and including the BOM. Third, Cisco pushes
BOM updates to the CMs on regular basis. Finally, CMs provide visibility to Cisco of their inventory and
production through daily transmission of a "Supply Chain Data Transfer," also accomplished through a
B2B exchange.
Person-to-person electronic communication is another aspect of supplier relationships that is
evolving significantly at Cisco. Through extranet connections with its Tier is, Cisco has long used IP
telephony to conduct tele- and videoconferences. But within the last year or so, they have begun
developing "collaboration communities," utilizing more advanced communication technologies. Through
their recent purchase of Webex and introduction of the Telepresence product, Cisco actually owns some
of the technology it has begun utilizing. Webex allows for more multi-media interaction than typical
teleconferences by supporting file sharing, instant messaging, video conferencing and synchronized
sharing of presentations on each participant's computer. Telepresence takes videoconferencing to an
extremely high level of quality, to the extent that participants feel as if they are in the same room with
their remotely-located counterparts. In addition to Webex and Telepresence, Cisco is also exploiting
wikis as a way of sharing information across organizational boundaries.
In terms of supply chain proximity, these recent moves represent a distancing along the
organizational dimension, since Cisco "owns" less of the assets and activities of its supply chain. This has
also resulted in a distancing of proximity along the electronic dimension with respect to data exchange.
However, there has been an offsetting increase in proximity with regards to electronic people-to-people
communication and collaboration. Whether or not this has been a conscious decision, it may be that the
two opposite moves along the electronic dimension will result in a net zero change in electronic
proximity. It is also interesting to consider the blurring of the boundary between electronic and
geographic proximity that is occurring with the arrival of the latest communication technologies like
Telepresence. As videoconferencing and other collaborative tools become able to convey more subtle
and non-verbal aspects of people-to-people interaction as well as enabling more kinds of people-to-
people interaction to occur remotely (e.g., factory tours via streaming video, training via video, etc.), the
concept of "geographic proximity" may have to be redefined.
While specific cost and savings numbers were not available, Cisco's efforts to improve in the
area of supply chain management are reflected in its position in AMR Research's "Supply Chain Top 25"
rankings. From being unranked in 2004, Cisco has climbed in the rankings consistently year-over-year
and was ranked as having the eighth best supply chain in the world in 2008. Company interviews
confirmed that Cisco has increased inventory turns and managed costs more effectively as a result of
these efforts.
CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF SIKORSKY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CHANGHE
FOR PRODUCTION OF THE S-76 AIRFRAME
INTRODUCTION
Analysis of Sikorsky's relationship with Changhe vis-a-vis the S-76 airframe program is presented
here as a demonstration of how the frameworks and case studies presented in the preceding chapters
can be applied in ways to help a company strategically architect the relationship aspect of its supply
chain architecture. Although Sikorsky and Changhe's cooperation on the S-76 is still in its infancy,
enough collaboration has occurred that useful insights can be made and improvement opportunities
identified. In fact, this type of analysis should ideally be done even before collaboration between two
firms begins, and re-visited over time as strategic or operational circumstances change.
This analysis will consist of three parts. First, based on the characteristics of the product and
firms involved, an "ideal" relationship's characteristics will be established. After that, the actual current
state of relationship will be detailed. Finally, opportunities to improve the current state to the more
ideal state will be identified. The notion of "proximity" laid out in the Supply Chain Proximity framework
will serve as the primary means of describing relationship characteristics.
SIKORSKY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CHANGHE: IDEAL STATE
The Supply Chain Proximity framework suggests that there is a range of "proximity" that
customers can have with their suppliers and that the appropriate proximity, and therefore, appropriate
relationship, depends on the relevant product's architecture. Ferdow's Strategic Role of Foreign
Factories framework suggests that appropriate relationship is also based on the strategic role a factory
plays within a company's factory network. And Moeller et al.'s SRM framework that it is based both on
strategic importance and relationship contribution. All three frameworks will be utilized below to
examine what type of relationship Sikorsky should ideally have with Changhe.
Product architecture & supply chain architecture
The first step in analyzing the appropriateness of a given supply chain architecture is to analyze
the relevant product's architecture. Recalling the Supply Chain Proximity framework, products having
modular architecture tend to be best-supported by modular supply chains and products having integral
architecture tend to be best-supported by integrated supply chains. The product in the case of Sikorsky's
relationship with Changhe is the S-76 helicopter airframe.
The product architecture of the S-76 airframe was already analyzed in Chapter 2 as an example,
and found to be highly-integral in nature. Table 7 contains a summary of characteristics regarding the
integrality of the S-76 airframe's product architecture. Given that the S-76 airframe's product
architecture is integral in nature, it would be best supported by an integral supply chain. Integrality of
supply chain architecture is achieved through close proximity and therefore close relationship.
Table 7: S-76 Airframe integral product architecture
Characteristics indicating integral product Examples
architecture
Components with multiple functions * Fuel Cell stores fuel and provides aerodynamic
surface
* Upper Cabin Assembly houses other systems,
provides structural strength and serves
aerodynamic surface
Non-standard interfaces * Frame components' interfaces custom-designed
* Avionics system custom-designed
* Frame components often manually "custom fit"
together, requiring craftsman-like skills from
technicians
High level design parameters dependent on * Overall airframe weight is critical and depends
multiple components on all components' individual weights
Non-individually upgradeable components * Custom nature of avionics and other electronics
prevents upgrading of many other components
Highly-customizable * BOM varies by aircraft according to customer
requirements and latest engineering changes
* Parts shortages sometimes delay completion
only of specific aircraft
Factory strategic role
Looking at Changhe as an extension of Sikorsky's own factory network is another way to analyze
what type of relationship Sikorsky should seek to develop with it. According to Ferdows, factories can
play one of six roles, with varying levels of strategic performance and varying implications for
investment and relationship. The way to determine the factory's role is to, "start by answering two basic
questions...What is the primary strategic reason for the factory's location? What is the scope of its
current activities?" (Ferdows 76-77)
Primary strategic reason for Changhe's location
While China is a low cost country (LCC), Sikorsky's primary motivation for manufacturing the S-
76 airframe there is not access to low cost labor to serve export markets. The S-76 airframe is already
being produced in the Czech Republic, another LCC. Changhe is merely serving as the second source for
the airframe. Developing a second source for the airframe was itself a short-term strategic move aimed
at mitigating single-sourcing risks (hold-up, supply chain disruptions, etc.). But the second source didn't
have to be in China. China was chosen as a location primarily for market access. China promises to be a
significant market for commercial helicopters in the future as civil aviation there becomes deregulated,
and Sikorsky hopes to position itself to better serve that market by producing helicopters there. Local
production assists market access in two ways. First, in the aerospace industry, it is common for
developing countries to favor aircraft manufacturers who make at least a portion of their aircraft locally.
Second, producing locally will help Sikorsky compete on price better with local competitors by accessing
local-cost design and manufacturing labor and mitigating tariff and exchange rate pricing risks.
A secondary aspect of market access that has been important for Sikorsky is that of regulatory
acceptance. Sikorsky initially attempted to set up manufacturing operations in China for another
commercial aircraft airframe in a joint venture with a local private investor. They quickly realized,
however, that without a state-owned partner, they would find it difficult or impossible to gain
regulatory approval of the aircraft they manufactured by CAAC, China's equivalent of the U.S.'s FAA. But
by reforming the joint venture to include Changhe, a state-owned enterprise under the umbrella of AVIC,
China's parent aerospace company, they gained the connections, or guanxi, to ensure regulatory
approval for aircraft they manufactured in China. So, once China was chosen as a location for the
purpose of market access, partnering with Changhe in particular was also a strategic move designed to
gain market access.
Scope of current activities at Changhe
Sikorsky first began partnering with Changhe in the mid 1990's on the tail pylon of the S-92
commercial helicopter. Changhe signed on as a risk-sharing partner providing design, prototyping and
manufacturing services in exchange for a share of the aircraft's profits. The collaboration has been
successful, and Changhe still manufactures the S-92 tail pylon, manages the supply chain for its raw
materials and supports Sikorsky with engineering and design services related to it.
Collaboration on the S-76 airframe represented a significant step-change in complexity of
collaboration for the two companies. While Changhe has to-date not provided design or engineering
services for the airframe, manufacture and testing of the airframe is much more complex than that of
the S-92 tail pylon. Preparation for the program began in 2007, and actual manufacturing began in 2008.
During the initial phase of the program, Changhe will merely assemble airframes from kits of parts
delivered from Sikorsky's global supply chain. Management of the supply chain is actually being jointly
managed by Changhe and Shanghai Sikorsky, under the direction of a Sikorsky Global Supply Chain
Manager sitting in Shanghai.
Aero is also playing a fairly unique role in the program at Changhe. Despite being Changhe's
competitor (as the original single-source supplier for the airframe), they are supplying kits of almost all
sheet metal components to Changhe for the first phase of the program. They are also serving as a
purchaser and consolidator of most other components for the airframe during this phase. Shanghai
Sikorsky originally planned to assist Changhe in purchasing many of the non-sheet-metal components
directly, but found that many suppliers were wary of dealing with a Chinese customer, or were taking
advantage of the situation to try and boost the prices paid for their components.
Expectations now are that in the second phase of the program, Changhe will locally source most
of the sheet metal components, directly purchase other components and will also begin to play a more
independent role in managing the supply chain for the airframe. Further into the future, design and
engineering collaboration is expected, with the goal of some day jointly designing and producing and
"all-China" helicopter for the local market.
Placing Changhe in the strategic role framework
To summarize the above, Changhe's location, China, is currently strategically important for the
purpose of market access. Its current activities are primarily assembly-only, with some limited design
and engineering activities (for the S-92 tail pylon) and some limited responsibility for the supply chain (S-
92 fully and S-76 in a limited way). These match characteristics of Server and Contributor factories most
closely (Table 3 in Chapter 2 or Table 8 below). The current position is weighted more heavily towards a
Server factory, but given the future plans to increase product development and supply chain
management roles of Changhe, their strategic role will shift to more of that of a Contributor factory.
Table 8: Strategic roles of foreign factories
Factory Type Factory's Strategic Role Required Investments
Server factory * Access to local markets * Low level of product engineering
* Limited product modification skills & resources
Contributor factory * Access to local markets . Skilled engineering and
* Product and process development management talent & resources
* Supply chain management * Supply chain management skills
Now that Changhe's strategic role has been identified, the next step is to consider the
implications this has for how Sikorsky should manage its relationship with them. For the manufacturing-
only aspects of the collaboration, relatively lower levels of investment are required in terms of skill
development or transfer. Enough collaboration to effectively teach Changhe how to properly assemble
the airframe is all that is needed. Perhaps intense, but short-duration, on-site training from Sikorsky
manufacturing personnel would suffice. But for the Contributor roles, larger amounts of investment are
required. Joint product development will require sustained, intense cross-organizational interaction.
Supply chain management skills will also have to be transferred, and given that Changhe is expected to
take more responsibility for the supply chain management role in the near future, it makes sense that
investment in developing this capability should begin presently. Overall, the amount of inter-
organizational collaboration necessary to prepare Changhe for and sustain it in its strategic roles
indicates that Sikorsky needs to foster a relationship with Changhe that results in close supply chain
proximity.
Developing Changhe to be a Contributor factory, though, also entails risks. Changhe is already a
finished-product helicopter manufacturer and therefore a potential Sikorsky competitor. Realistically, it
will be a long time before Changhe is competitive on a global scale, but it could very quickly develop
strong enough capabilities to compete against Sikorsky in China and other developing-world markets.
When looking at Changhe's current capabilities, design, global supply chain management and sales and
marketing are functions that stand out as weaknesses. Developing Changhe's capabilities to serve as a
Contributor would involve boosting their capabilities in two of these three functions. Therefore
Sikorsky's actions to develop Changhe as a supplier will also serve to develop a stronger potential
competitor. This risk of collaboration may be justified by the benefit of China market access. In other
words, it may be better to share the market with Changhe as a condition of access rather than being
only able to offer expensive non-China manufactured products to the Chinese market. Also, Sikorsky can
potentially mitigate the risk of competition by continuing to develop a closer relationship with Changhe
to the extent that they are able to serve the Chinese market primarily as partners rather than as
adversaries.
Another risk that comes with deeper collaboration involving product development is
inappropriate usage of intellectual property (IP). Collaborating on product development will
undoubtedly involve sharing of proprietary technology and designs with Changhe by Sikorsky. Sikorsky
should definitely have systems in place governing access to, and usage of, its IP. But even with
preventative measures in place, risk will remain. China has a poor history of IP protection, and with
Changhe's status as a state-owned enterprise, it is hard to imagine it ever being held liable by Chinese
courts for infringement of Sikorsky's intellectual property rights. Mitigating the risk of IP misuse will
require Sikorsky carefully thinking through which types of components or systems are "safe" to
collaborate on and which are not, and limiting collaboration in product development to "safe"
components. Interviews with Sikorsky management indicated that this risk is being considered and
planned for accordingly.
Supplier relationship management framework
Another take on determining the level of relationship suitable in developing a particular supplier
is Moeller et al.'s Supplier Relationship Management framework's strategic importance vs. relationship
contribution matrix (Figure 2, pg 16). Along the dimension of strategic importance, Changhe would rank
mid-to-high importance, since they are considered to be key to accessing the China market in the future,
but aren't playing that role yet (since the market isn't yet developed). Along the dimension of
relationship contribution, Changhe ranks fairly low. They currently provide minimal design and
engineering support and minimal supply chain management. They primarily provide manufacturing
capacity only. This would indicate that Changhe should be categorized as a "Potential Value Enhancer"
placed in the upper-left quadrant of the matrix. According to SRM, Changhe can be managed by either
Development Management or Contract Management, or some combination of the two. However, if
Changhe's relationship contribution grows over time, as Sikorsky expects it to, it will become a Real
Value Enhancer (top right quadrant), suitable for a greater degree of Development Management.
To the extent that Sikorsky believes it should pursue a Development Management type
relationship with Changhe, it should be prepared to make specific investments to the relationship that
will allow Changhe's performance as a supplier to improve over time. These specific investments would
likely consist of training and teaching resources in the form of one or two-way people exchanges.
Because Sikorsky's relationship with Changhe is still relatively young, at least with respect to the
S-76 program, it would still be worth considering Set-up Management aspects of SRM as well. During the
Set-up Management phase of the supplier relationship, both the customer and supplier need to make
"valuable and necessary" investments in the supplier according to the supplier's potential strategic
value. One primary benefit of these investments is to signal relationship commitment and build trust.
Given that Sikorsky's plan is for Changhe to be a fairly strategic, long-term supplier and partner in China,
it makes sense for there to be this type of investment made early in the relationship.
Supply chain proximity conclusion
All three frameworks suggest that Sikorsky should seek relatively close supply chain proximity to
Changhe. The S-76 airframe's architecture is highly integral and can be best produced by an integral
supply chain. Changhe's strategic role as a factory is significant and will grow over time, as will its
relationship contribution. Specific investments made as part of the Set-up Management and
Development Management phases of SRM would be appropriate.
SIKORSKY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CHANGHE: CURRENT STATE & IMPROVEMENT OPPORTUNITIES
The next step in the analysis is to determine what the current state of relationship with Changhe
is by examining each of the four dimensions of supply chain proximity (geographic, organizational,
cultural, electronic) and then determining what is being done well and what opportunities for
improvement there are.
Comparison with Toyota partnering model
Comparison with Liker's Toyota supplier partnering model provides a quick, high-level view of
how well Sikorsky is doing in managing its relationship with Changhe versus best practices. Overall,
Sikorsky appears headed in the right direction, with activity in five of the six levels of the Toyota supplier
partnering hierarchy (Table 9). The very top level, joint improvement activities, is not something Sikorsky
is engaging with Changhe on in any sustained, formal way currently. However, production is in its very
beginning stages and so it is not possible to conduct such activities across the full-breadth of operations
there yet. Even at this early stage however, there are opportunities to work with Changhe on visual
management and 5S implementation on its factory floor. A one-off materials management audit of
Changhe was conducted recently by Shanghai Sikorsky procurement team staff and the improvement
opportunities discovered were well received by Changhe. This might indicate they will be welcoming of
future joint improvement activities.
However, depth of activity or investment in the other five levels does not yet compare favorably
with the Toyota model. Systems and norms for collaboration are in place, but the amount of and level of
people involvement by Sikorsky is not yet comparable with Toyota. Currently there is no engagement
from Sikorsky upper management in relationship building and problem solving. Sikorsky has what
amounts to a skeleton crew of staff located at Changhe, which is capable of facilitating and managing
the collaboration, but not capable of ramping-up at the pace desired by Sikorsky. Additionally, there is
no Changhe staff co-located at Sikorsky or Aero facilities.
Comparison with Toyota partnering model: Improvement opportunities
UTC has developed its own version of TPS called ACE (Achieving Competitive Excellence) and is
quite far down the path in its implementation in many of its businesses. UTC has corporate staff that
assists facilities with ACE implementation and has even begun pushing ACE into the supply base. There
are multiple UTC facilities in China that have achieved "ACE Gold," UTC's highest rating for ACE
implementation and compliance. Given these resources, Sikorsky might consider moving towards
conducting "Level Six" partnering with Changhe by:
* Giving Changhe production staff and management tours of a UTC facility in China that has
achieved ACE Gold and explaining the key components of the system.
* Deploying a UTC or Sikorsky team to Changhe to conduct joint kaizen events. This could be done
now, with a focus on factory floor visual management and 5S, or in the future, with a focus on
actual production flow.
In terms of people investment, Sikorsky has several opportunities for improvement:
* Get high-level (VP or higher) Sikorsky management more engaged in the collaboration
on both relationship building and problem-solving.
* Improve development of Changhe's capabilities by co-locating some of their staff at
Sikorsky or Aero
* Increase the amount of Sikorsky people resources co-located at Changhe
Table 9: Sikorsky vs. Toyota's supplier partnering hierarchy
Toyota Supplier-Partnering Practices Sikorsky Activities at Changhe
Conduct joint improvement activities * N/A
Share information intensively but selectively * Exchange drawing, work instruction and
engineering change orders
Develop suppliers' technical capabilities * Minimal staff co-located at Changhe
* No Changhe staff co-located at Sikorsky
* Competing supplier sends production workers to
train Changhe's workers
* Shanghai Sikorsky assisting in supply chain
management
Supervise your suppliers * Minimal staff co-located at Changhe
* Regular program review meetings
* Visibility into Changhe's inventory and
production
* No engagement by Sikorsky upper management
Turn supplier rivalry into opportunity * Dual-sourcing at Changhe
* Utilizing competing supplier to train Changhe
Understand how your suppliers work * Minimal staff co-located at Changhe
* No co-location of Changhe staff at Sikorsky
* Local Chinese employees on Sikorsky
procurement team
* Changhe representative on Shanghai Sikorsky
management team
Sikorsky in the Supply Chain Proximity framework
When viewed at a very high level, the supply chain proximity between Sikorsky and Changhe is
fairly distant along all four dimensions (Figure 7). Sikorsky is headquartered in Stratford, Connecticut, as
are the bulk of its engineering, manufacturing and supply chain staff. Changhe is headquartered 7,500
miles away in Jingdezhen, China, where its entire staff is located. Organizationally, the companies share
ownership in the JV Shanghai Sikorsky, which is primarily tasked with supporting supply chain
management for the S-76 program at Changhe. The JV structure of Shanghai Sikorsky, however, has little
impact on its day to day operation. Sikorsky is a publicly-traded American company. Changhe is a state-
owned Chinese company. Both are independently operating subsidiaries of larger parent companies.
Finally, Sikorsky and Changhe have separate and non-integrated ERP systems. There is, however, an
electronic system utilized for ordering product and exchanging technical information (drawings, change
orders, etc.) called the Supplier Data System (SDS). Electronic communication consists of email,
telephone calls and teleconferences.
Analyzing supply chain proximity at a more granular level, however, is a more useful exercise. It
reveals a variance of proximity within each dimension, either by function (e.g., procurement vs.
manufacturing) or by sub-element (e.g., MRP systems vs. CAD systems in the Electronic dimension). It
also allows for very specific practices and situations to be identified and evaluated. What follows is a
more granular analysis of the four dimensions of supply chain proximity between Sikorsky and Changhe.
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Figure 7: High-level supply chain proximity between Sikorsky and Changhe
Geographic dimension
Along the geographic dimension, there is a variance in geographic proximity of the various
organizational functions with their Changhe counterparts. While all Changhe personnel are located in
Jingdezhen, China, Sikorsky has people from various functions located closer to, and in higher numbers
than others to Jingdezhen. (Figure 8)
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Figure 8: Functional-level geographic supply chain proximity between Sikorsky and Changhe
* Program management for the S-76 is based in Stratford, with trips to Jingdezhen for program
reviews approximately quarterly.
* Procurement has a team of seven people located at Shanghai Sikorsky in Shanghai, China
* Manufacturing and quality have between seven and 10 people co-located at Changhe's factory
supporting ramp-up of the S-76 program and ongoing production of S-92 tail pylons.
* Design and engineering are located in Stratford, with little or no presence in Jingdezhen
currently, except for support of the S-92 tail pylon.
* Sub-tier suppliers are all located outside of China, with localization of certain content planned
for the future.
Geographic dimension: Procurement
Shanghai, the location of Sikorsky's procurement team in China, is approximately 375 miles from
Jingdezhen. This distance is certainly geographically much closer to Jingdezhen than is Stratford (7,500
miles). Travel time from Stratford to Jingdezhen requires a minimum of two days travel time each way,
in addition to having to deal with visas, jet-lag and other international travel inconveniences. Travel time
to Jingdezhen from Shanghai is only one hour and doesn't require dealing with international travel
inconveniences. However, despite the fact that a Sikorsky procurement team is located in the same
country as Changhe, face-to-face interaction with Changhe counterparts does still require a plane flight
from Shanghai to Jingdezhen, or vice versa.
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As a result of this remaining separation, most interaction with the Changhe procurement
department still occurs via email and telephone, albeit from within the same time zone. Additionally, the
quality of teleconferencing equipment and internet access at the Shanghai Sikorsky office are poor and
make even this remote communication less effective than it could be. Purchasing agents from each
organization rarely have face-time with each other. According to Allen, the frequency with which they
communicate with each other also suffers as a result of this physical separation. Recall that Figure 5
indicates that almost all of the benefits of physical proximity with regards to communication frequency
are realized within a physical separation of 50 meters or less. So while 375 miles of separation is better
than 7,500 miles, it may not be good enough to achieve truly close geographic proximity.
By being in Shanghai, Sikorsky is capturing some of the benefits of being in the China. In addition
to closer geographic proximity to Changhe, China has lower cost labor than the U.S. and also a larger
pool of bi-lingual professionals. But, one might ask, why didn't Sikorsky choose to co-locate its
procurement team in Jingdezhen at the Changhe factory where it does have other personnel co-located
rather than in Shanghai? Part of the reason is that Shanghai Sikorsky's Shanghai office was already in
existence and had underutilized procurement staff, which allowed faster ramp-up of the procurement
function for the S-76 program in China. In addition to this, Jingdezhen is a small, interior city, making it
more difficult to locally hire high quality bi-lingual professionals and is an unattractive relocation option
for both expatriate and Chinese managers.
One interesting paradox of geographic proximity is that moving closer to one supplier might
move the customer farther away from its other suppliers. Currently, Changhe is the only S-76 airframe
supplier in China. Most components are produced in the U.S. or Europe. But since the China S-76
airframe procurement team is now located in Shanghai and made up of Chinese procurement agents,
there is no one in the U.S. responsible for managing U.S. suppliers, and no Americans to do the
communicating with them from China. So, geographic proximity with suppliers in the U.S. and Europe
has become more distant as a result of Sikorsky's decision to base the procurement function in Shanghai.
This has led to time lags in communicating with suppliers. This geographic move has also led to a
distancing culturally between Sikorsky and its suppliers. Language barriers cause difficulties at times.
Additionally, some of the local Chinese staff in Shanghai have little experience in working with western
suppliers and using the more direct, and sometimes even aggressive, communication tactics necessary
when working with them.
Geographic dimension: Procurement improvement opportunities
Given that the procurement team has already been established in Shanghai (for some very
legitimate reasons), achieving closer geographic proximity with Changhe will require overcoming the
remaining 375 mile gap between the two companies' locations. This can be accomplished in several
ways:
Increase the frequency of trips to Jingdezhen by Shanghai Sikorsky staff. Travel between the two
locations is inexpensive and relatively convenient, and will result in significantly more face-time
with Changhe counterparts.
* Co-locate part of the procurement team at Changhe. Since co-locating the entire team is not
currently feasible, co-locating a few members represents a partial solution. They can serve as
the "face" of the Shanghai-based procurement team to Changhe. The manager of the Shanghai
Sikorsky procurement team, in fact, already has plans to co-locate a team member at Changhe.
* Improve the quality of telecommunications equipment and internet access. Ensuring that
teleconferences are clear will improve the effectiveness of remote communication, especially
since Chinese staff often must communicate in their second language (English) with Sikorsky
managers. Use of videoconferencing would help even more.
* Consider a "split" procurement team that still has members located in the U.S. who are in the
same time zone as American suppliers, are able to communicate more fluently in English with
these suppliers and are experienced in the tactics and communication styles effective in dealing
with them.
Cultural dimension: U.S. & China national culture differences
Hofstede's five dimensions of national cultural difference provide one good framework for more
closely analyzing the nationality aspects of cultural proximity between Sikorsky and Changhe.
According to the values for each dimension listed in Figure 9, Masculinity and Uncertainty
Avoidance represent aspects of national culture where Sikorsky and Changhe have close proximity,
while the other three dimensions represent aspects of national culture where they do not have close
proximity.
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Figure 9: Hofstede dimensions of national cultural difference for the U.S. and China
China's relatively higher power distance score means that Changhe is likely to have a more
hierarchical organizational structure where decision making is more centralized than at Sikorsky. This
type of mismatch does exist in the procurement functions within each organization. Sikorsky's
expatriate manager who leads the procurement team in Shanghai has much greater decision making
authority from Sikorsky than his counterpart at Changhe has from Changhe's management. In fact, he
has decision making authority on the order of Changhe's VP of Procurement. But because of the
hierarchical nature of Changhe's organization, it is difficult for Sikorsky's supply chain manager to gain
access to Changhe's VP of Procurement. Changhe's likely point of view is that their VP of Procurement
should deal directly with Sikorsky's VP of Supply Management. But currently, Sikorsky's VP of Supply
Management is not involved in-depth with the S-76 program at Changhe and has no relationship with
his counterpart there. All of this has led to inefficiencies in helping Changhe negotiate contracts with
sub-tier suppliers and frustrating delays.
Similarly, the mismatch along the Individuality dimension has caused frustrations for Sikorsky.
China's low individuality score indicates that Changhe employees might have a preference for group
decision making and place high value on consensus. Rather than being able to reach immediate
conclusions during conversations or negotiations, the response of Changhe's representatives is often
that they must confirm decisions with others in the organization. This is certainly partially due to the
Power Distance issues discussed above, but also derives from a desire to make final decisions in a
collective way.
This Individuality mismatch may have even hurt procurement efforts from the very beginning.
Purchase contracts with certain sub-tier suppliers were negotiated by Sikorsky on Changhe's behalf
before engagement with Changhe's procurement department began. Sikorsky likely thought that as a
company that was experienced in dealing with these sub-tier suppliers and had existing relationships
with them, they were doing Changhe a favor by negotiating ahead of time for them on their behalf. It is
easy to see how this, "We are the experts, so let us do this for you," mentality, while helpful in intent,
may only fit well in a culture with high individualistic orientation. But rather than accept these contracts
negotiated on their behalf by Sikorsky, Changhe has chosen to renegotiate some of the more significant
ones, leading to delays in purchasing component inventory. Given China's high collectivist orientation, if
Sikorsky had used a "We're the expert, so let's do this together" approach to negotiating purchasing
contracts, Changhe might have found the same exact outcomes of negotiations to be more acceptable
because all relevant parties would have been involved in the decision making.
China's much stronger relative Long-term Orientation indicates that Changhe will in general be
more long-term future-oriented in its strategy for its relationship with Sikorsky. Sikorsky is likely to be
more focused on the speed with which the relationship can begin to generate profits, while Changhe
may be more focused on positioning itself to be a major contender in the aerospace industry in the
future. This is reflected in a perceived lack of urgency on their part by Sikorsky and an emphasis by
Changhe on learning and technology transfer from Sikorsky.
Cultural dimension: U.S., China & Czech Republic national culture differences
Another important aspect of national culture for Sikorsky to consider is the differences in
culture between the Czech Republic, where it first outsourced production of the S-76 airframe, and
China, the location of its current outsourcing effort. Figure 10 again shows Hofstede scores for the U.S.
and China, but this time also with scores for the Czech Republic added for comparison. All three
countries have similar scores on the Masculinity dimension. Along the Power Distance and Individuality
dimensions, the Czech Republic falls in between the U.S. and China scores, indicating it is more similar to
China and the U.S. along these dimensions than the U.S. and China are to each other. Along the final two
dimensions, Uncertainty Avoidance and Long-term Orientation, the Czech Republic is even more
dissimilar with China than is the U.S.
There are three important implications of these relative scores amongst the three nations. First,
the nature of cultural differences they need to deal with at Changhe are different than at Aero, both in
type and degree, and so the tactics necessary to deal with them may be different. For example, both the
Czech Republic and China score higher than the U.S. in Power Distance. Whatever tactics Sikorsky found
useful in overcoming this cultural difference at Aero may be useful at Changhe as well, but may have to
be used to a greater degree, given China's even higher Power Distance score. But in the case of Long-
term Orientation, Sikorsky can leverage little or nothing from its dealings with Aero to inform it as to
how to deal with China - the two countries are polar opposites along this dimension. Certainly, Sikorsky
should leverage past learnings from working with Aero at Changhe when appropriate, but this must be
done on a case-by-case basis after careful comparison of Chinese and Czech culture.
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Figure 10: Hofstede dimensions of national cultural difference for the U.S., China and Czech Republic
The second implication of these scores is that Changhe and Aero will have their own set of
challenges in working together due to their own differences in national culture. During the first phase of
the S-76 program at Changhe, Aero will be the single largest supplier and is also being tapped by
Sikorsky to train Changhe how to build the airframe (since Sikorsky no longer has full internal capability
in this area). This means that Changhe and Aero have been working together quite closely on the
program's ramp-up in China.
One interesting example of conflict in this area has been training of Changhe production staff by
Aero's production staff. Aero has sent teams of production workers and engineers to Changhe on a
rotating basis to teach them about their tooling and assembly techniques. Aero's technicians, though,
felt that rather than willingly accept the techniques they were teaching, Changhe's staff often expressed
that their own existing techniques were superior to the ones Aero was teaching them. Several months
into the cooperation, one Aero engineering manager remarked that the teams they sent ended up
frustrated at what they felt was the Changhe staff's "arrogance" and lack of teachability. He doubted
whether there was significant value in continuing to send his people to train Changhe. There are likely
multiple factors that led to this particular dysfunction, and national cultural differences are probably
amongst them. The Czech Republic and China have a significant mismatch in Long-term Orientation
according to Hofstede's analyses. One feature of Short-term Orientation, that held by the Czechs, is a
strong respect for tradition. On the manufacturing floor, this very likely manifests itself as pride in
technique and a belief that "the way we've always done things" is probably the right way to continue
doing them. If Aero's trainers believed this, it may have led them to react strongly against Changhe's
seemingly arrogant willingness to discard proven, time-tested techniques for their own techniques.
Whatever the reason for Changhe's seeming unwillingness to accept Changhe's technical training, if they
had understood their counterparts' Short-term Orientation, expressed as strong respect for tradition,
they might have taken a different approach in their response to the training. Perhaps they could have
expressed greater appreciation for and admiration of the techniques being taught by Aero while the
trainers were present, and then after completion of training, internally make decisions about whether or
not to adopt specific techniques.
The third implication is that the customer may need to serve as a kind of cultural coach for its
various suppliers that have to work together. Knowing how both Aero and Change operate, Sikorsky can
play a valuable role in helping the two suppliers better understand each other in light of national
cultural differences. Transfer of cultural learnings from the customer to its suppliers could be a valuable
source of joint continuous improvement efforts - continuous relationship improvement.
Cultural dimension: National culture differences & language
Language is, of course, another important component of national cultural difference. Changhe's
employees are all native Chinese speakers and most of Sikorsky's employees are native English speakers.
Language then, represents a significant barrier to close cultural proximity between the two
organizations. Both, however, have bi-lingual Chinese employees who are able to bridge the language
barrier that exists. However, the English skill level of all but a few of the bi-lingual staff is at a fairly basic
level. This results in a reluctance to communicate by telephone in situations requiring interaction in
English, such as calling U.S. suppliers to discuss problems. It also occasionally results in unclear written
communication. Both of these situations lead to a slower accomplishment of tasks. Despite having bi-
lingual employees, language is still an element of culture where there is not close proximity between the
two organizations or between the two organizations' Chinese staff and the international supply base.
UTC, Sikorsky's parent company, is aware of its need to overcome cultural barriers as it does
more business in and with China and is hiring native mainland Chinese who have spent significant time
in the U.S. for graduate school and work to return to China and manage its businesses there. Sikorsky is
making headway in bringing on bi-cultural, bi-lingual managers as well. Shanghai Sikorsky's current GM
is a Chinese man who went to work for UTC in the U.S. after graduate school and recently returned to
China to take the GM position. Sikorsky has also placed a Chinese quality engineer who previously
worked for Sikorsky in the U.S. on its team co-located in Jingdezhen.
Cultural dimension: Home market characteristics
While the differences in nationality between Sikorsky's and Changhe's employees are significant,
they do not represent the only cultural differences between the two organizations. Past and present
home market conditions in the two countries are also quite different. China's economy today has a
much greater degree of freedom and greater contribution from the private sector than ever before. By
almost any measure, it has a free market economy. But there are still vestiges of a state-controlled
economy lingering in certain protected industries. Changhe is, in fact, a state-owned enterprise which
primarily produces helicopters for the Chinese military. Even as the Chinese economy liberalized, state-
owned enterprises were deemed worthy of protection and subsidization by the government in order to
keep unemployment levels low and protect certain industries from foreign competition. This is
especially the case for ones whose primary customer is the government. The "corporate welfare" that
state-owned enterprises often receive has led to a weaker profit-orientation than private-sector firms
like Sikorsky.
This is often beneficial to foreign customers who find that these companies will produce and sell
goods for unmatchable low prices compared with firms that must be profitable to survive. Because of
state-support, these firms are also often amongst the few in a given industry in China with the financial
means to invest in the most expensive capital equipment, like the very expensive machine tools
required to manufacture many aerospace components. Their weaker profit-orientation, however, also
has its downsides. There is typically also a corresponding lack of urgency in doing business that can
prove frustrating to profit-oriented firms seeking to bring new products to the market as fast as possible.
In the ramp-up of the S-76 project, Sikorsky has often experienced this frustration, as Changhe doesn't
seem to prepare ahead of time, allocate additional resources or order component inventory as quickly
as Sikorsky believes they should. There are no incentives for on-time or early delivery of products or
penalties for late delivery in Sikorsky's contract with Changhe.
In place of strong profit-orientation, many Chinese state-owned firms, or any other Chinese
firms, for that matter, have a very strong learning-orientation. They desire to improve their
technological capabilities by learning from the world and become world-class manufacturers. This
means that often they are more interested in the knowledge they can gain from collaboration with a
foreign customer than they are with the short term profit potential of the collaboration. This is one of
the reasons, beyond its own strategic interests, that Sikorsky has agreed to collaborate with Changhe in
product development at some point in the future. But this learning-orientation also means that Sikorsky
must be vigilant about IP protection, especially given China's history of weak legal protection of IP rights.
Cultural dimension: Individual firm experiences
The experiences of a firm, either individually or collectively over time, work to affect the firm's
culture. Many Chinese firms still have relatively little experience doing business with foreign customers.
And due to various reasons, cultural misunderstandings among them, they have sometimes had
negative experiences with the foreign customers they have worked with. This is the case with Changhe.
Prior to cooperating with Sikorsky on the S-76 airframe, Changhe began working with Augusta to
produce airframes for one of Augusta's helicopters. This program has now been underway for
approximately four years, but Changhe has yet to ship their first completed airframe to them. Numerous
manufacturing and quality issues have been encountered and Changhe now has a hangar full of
completed airframes that it cannot ship to its customer. Instead, it is forced to continue carrying huge
amounts of inventory on its books until quality problems are resolved and it is able to ship the
completed airframes. Even its past experiences with Sikorsky on the S-92 tail pylon include an instance
of Changhe feeling that an agreed-upon material price escalation clause in its contract with Sikorsky was
not properly administered, causing Changhe to incur a significant financial loss in the early stages of
production of the tail pylon. It should be expected that, collectively, these experiences would lead
Changhe to be more risk averse when it comes to purchasing component inventory for new programs
than it otherwise would be.
With the current S-76 airframe program, Changhe is solely responsible for much of the up-front
investment required. They purchased and own the tooling, are responsible for purchasing test
equipment and also purchase and own all inventory. Since the original purchase contract between
Changhe and Sikorsky was negotiated, Changhe has insisted on re-negotiating an inventory carrying-cost
subsidy, but as of the end of 2008, was still purchasing component inventory at a pace much slower
than what Sikorsky wanted.
Cultural dimension: Improvement opportunities
Sikorsky will never become a Chinese company, nor will Changhe ever become an American
company. Dominant ethnicities in each organization will ensure that their respective national cultures
persist. Similarly, neither company can shed the aspects of their culture determined by their home
market or specific experiences. But based on the above analysis, though, there are several opportunities
for Sikorsky to improve its closeness with Changhe on the cultural dimension of supply chain proximity.
* Greater engagement of Sikorsky functional leaders, such as the VP of Supply Chain, might result
in better access to the real decision makers at Changhe. When someone such as the VP of
Supply Chain does visit Changhe, he should be sure to include the on-the-ground Sikorsky
managers in meetings he has with Changhe upper management as a means of elevating their
status in the eyes of Changhe. Over time, this may result in their being more able to directly
engage higher level managers in Changhe on issues they need support on.
* Be more understanding of Chinese counterparts' desire for consensus and collective decision
making, as well as the need to adhere to their company's hierarchy by allowing time for multiple
rounds of negotiations or conversations before a final decision is demanded.
* Restructuring or amending the contract with Changhe in such a way that Sikorsky engages in
more risk sharing up front or makes some type of commitment to Changhe's profitability (a la
Toyota) might result in Changhe having a greater comfort level with purchasing inventory and
test equipment at the pace Sikorsky wants. This risk sharing could take the form of joint
investment in tooling or test equipment. It could also take the form of Sikorsky initially
purchasing component inventory and transferring ownership of it to Changhe once it reaches
Changhe's factory. This would save Changhe from having to worry over the details of every
purchasing agreement with the many component suppliers and purchase only from Sikorsky,
with whom they are in partnership.
* Providing English language tutoring to both Shanghai Sikorsky and Changhe staff would lower
some of the communication barriers that currently exist.
* Creating rotational positions that allow U.S. employees to spend time in China or vice versa will
help Sikorsky's employees become more sensitive to the complexities of working cross-culturally.
This idea has already been proposed by Shanghai Sikorsky's procurement team manager and is
currently in the planning stage.
* Continuing or even strengthening its practice of hiring mainland Chinese people who have spent
significant time working in the U.S. to return to China and manage its businesses there will
improve the organization's ability to culturally adapt and educate itself about cultural aspects of
doing business in China.
Organizational dimension
One way to analyze the organizational dimension of supply chain proximity is to think of it in
terms of specific investments that each firm makes in the relationship, per Moellar et al.'s SRM
framework and Ferdow's strategic role of factories: the greater the amount of investment, the closer the
organizational proximity between the two companies.
In the case of Sikorsky and Changhe, Sikorsky has made some significant specific investments in
people resources. Between seven and 10 Sikorsky staff work with Changhe in China on a full-time basis
supporting ramp-up of the S-76 program. Other program management and technical staff also visit
Changhe regularly to provide support. Sikorsky's ability to provide people resources however, is
somewhat limited. They no longer produce the S-76 airframe in-house and so some of the shop-floor
level technical know-how no longer resides in a coherent way internally at Sikorsky. Their single-source
supplier in the Czech Republic, Aero, is now the expert when it comes to building the airframe.
Additionally, Sikorsky's business is currently booming, and underutilized people resources are hard to
come by. They have however, hired an engineer who formerly worked for Aero and have a program in
which Aero sends some of its production workers to Changhe on a rotating basis to teach them how to
assemble the airframe. Despite the fact that Aero is a crucial player in the first phase of the program,
though, there is no direct linkage between the top management of Change and Aero.
One specific way Sikorsky is investing in the program with people resources is through the
formation of Shanghai Sikorsky, a JV with Changhe. One of the primary near-term functions of Shanghai
Sikorsky is to provide supply chain management expertise during the early phases of the program, since
Changhe has little experience purchasing internationally.
In terms of capital investment, Changhe has carried the large part of the up-front investment
burden of tooling, test equipment and inventory. Tooling and test equipment costs are estimated at
$1.5M-$2.5M, all of which has been or will be purchased by Changhe. Component inventory costs
approximately $2M per airframe, and again, Changhe is responsible for the cost of purchasing and
holding inventory. Because the program is in the ramp-up phase and production therefore is moving
slowly, it is expected that it will take more than a year to complete the first aircraft after
commencement of production. Due to this long production lead time and uncertainties regarding
production and inventory lead time, inventory turns are expected to be very low, and inventory carrying
costs to be on the order of $160,000 per airframe initially. Sikorsky will reimburse Changhe for a portion
of its tooling and equipment costs, but reimbursement will be amortized over several years' worth of
production. Sikorsky has also agreed to compensate Changhe for a portion of inventory carrying costs,
on the order of $30K per airframe, and has also made some supplementary payments for excessive test
equipment costs that were not predicted accurately during initial contract negotiations.
Contrast this with the ramp-up for manufacture of the S-76 airframe at Aero in 2002. At that
time, Sikorsky manufactured the airframe in-house, but the aerospace market as a whole was in a down
period. 9/11 had led to economic slowdown and the military spending boom from the Afghanistan and
Iraq wars had not yet started. So when Sikorsky made the decision to transfer manufacture of the S-76
airframe to Aero, they had good availability of people resources and those people were the experts at
making S-76 airframes. Sikorsky had a team of between 15 and 30 people at any one time on the ground
at Aero assisting with ramp-up. Additionally, since Sikorsky was shutting-down their own production of
the airframe, they just shipped all of their own already-qualified tooling to Aero for its use. And since
sales were slow, Sikorsky had enough inventory to allow them to send some completed sub-assemblies
to Aero, which allowed Aero to not only have physical samples to examine, but also to begin
manufacturing in a more step-wise fashion, rather than having to build from scratch from the very first
airframe.
The goal of this comparison is not to show that a certain level of investment is "right" or "wrong,"
but to highlight what differing levels of organizational proximity might look like. Sikorsky has certainly
made some significant specific investments in its relationship with Changhe, especially in the area of
people resources. However, this investment pales in comparison to the investment made in its
relationship with Aero in 2002. In the language of the Supply Chain Proximity framework, Sikorsky took
greater effort to develop closer organizational proximity with Aero during ramp-up than it has so far
with Changhe, and was already "closer" in terms of cultural proximity to Aero than Changhe to begin
with.
What is important, though, is the expected effect of the greater organizational distance with
Changhe. It would be logical to conclude that one effect of this disparity in investment would be slower
ramp-up time at Changhe than at Aero. Fewer support resources will mean that Changhe has to learn
more on its own, which will take time. Another effect may be a lower level of perceived buy-in or
commitment by Sikorsky from Changhe's perspective. This in turn, might reinforce Changhe's reluctance
to deploy its own capital at the rate Sikorsky wants.
Organizational dimension: Improvement opportunities
Along the organizational dimension, selecting the "right" amount of proximity in this case
depends on Sikorsky's goals for the program in terms of ramp-up speed. Simply put, higher levels of
specific investments as part of the "Set-up Management" effort by Sikorsky will result in faster ramp-up
of the program at Changhe. To the extent that Sikorsky is interested in faster ramp-up, it might consider:
* Bearing a greater share of the capital/risk burden for the program by owning inventory for some
portion of the production process or jointly investing in tooling and test equipment up-front.
* Making a capital investment in the form of sending sub-assemblies to Changhe as samples to
speed their move down the production learning curve. This is difficult to do in the current
market environment where Sikorsky has a significant order backlog for the S-76 already, but
may be worth it in the long run.
* Sending a team of Changhe manufacturing staff to Aero's factory to learn from them since
Sikorsky itself can't provide the level of production expertise to Changhe that it was able to
provide Aero.
Electronic dimension
The two main aspects of the electronic dimension of supply chain proximity currently relevant to
Sikorsky's relationship with Changhe are electronic information exchange and electronic communication.
Sikorsky and Changhe each have their own MRP system, with no direct integration between
them. But there are "syncing" activities that occur to ensure that the BOM Changhe uses is the latest
version from Sikorsky and to ensure that when Changhe makes changes to the BOM, Sikorsky is notified.
Engineering change orders are also handled through an electronic system. And through its web-based
SDS, Sikorsky exchanges ordering and shipment information with Changhe. The procurement team at
Shanghai Sikorsky is not currently connected with either Sikorsky's or Changhe's MRP systems, despite
the fact that it is tasked with helping manage procurement of all components from over 200 suppliers.
The team currently uses Excel spreadsheets to transfer purchasing and inventory information between
suppliers, Changhe and itself.
As mentioned in the geographic dimension section, all electronic communication occurs via
email and telephone. Teleconferences often have participants in three or more locations globally. At the
Shanghai Sikorsky office, internet connection speed and poor teleconferencing equipment negatively
affect the quality of electronic voice communication. Videoconferencing is not currently used.
Electronic dimension: Improvement opportunities
Improving the quality of electronic voice communications would be easy to do and is especially
critical given that most participants in conference calls are communicating in their second language.
* Replace teleconference phones at Shanghai Sikorsky.
* Invest in faster data lines at Shanghai Sikorsky.
* Experiment with free videoconferencing options like Skype.
* Experiment with more sophisticated video/teleconference options, like WebEx, which allow for
sharing of visual media (Power Point slides), written communication (chatting) and video, in
addition to voice.
Improving Shanghai Sikorsky's ability to track and share ordering and inventory data is also critical as
the program ramps-up and more suppliers have to be dealt with.
* Investigate feasibility of integrating with either Sikorsky's or Changhe's MRP system. This has
been suggested by Shanghai Sikorsky and is currently in the process of being investigated.
* If MRP integration proves to be unfeasible, invest in a simplified off-the-shelf MRP system that
for more efficient collection and exchange of information than is possible with the spreadsheets
currently being used.
SELECTION AND PRIORITIZATION OF SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIP INVESTMENT OPTIONS
All of the improvement opportunities for Sikorsky listed in above sections would require
spending a certain amount of money or people resources to accomplish, and theoretically, should result
in an improved supplier relationship with Changhe. Drawing again from terminology introduced in the
discussion of the Supplier Relationship Management framework, these improvement opportunities can
be thought of as potential investments to be made in Sikorsky's relationship with Changhe. Before
taking any of these actions however, Sikorsky must determine if the effect of a given action, its return on
investment, justifies the investment. And for any company, the ultimate effect of actions should be
measured by their impact on the company's profits. That is, does taking a certain action lower costs,
increase revenues, or perhaps even both? If so, what is the magnitude of the effect and how quickly will
it be realized?
In the case of Sikorsky's cooperation with Changhe on the S-76 airframe, actions which have the
effect of shortening production lead time during the ramp-up phase of the program should be strongly
considered. As of the end of 2008, Sikorsky had an order backlog for the S-76 of almost two years, or
approximately 100 aircraft, representing approximately $1B in sales. This means that every airframe
Changhe is able to produce has already been sold to a customer, and any acceleration in the ramp-up of
production capacity will result in an acceleration of revenue recognition and/or net cash inflows.1 Just
how valuable ramp-up acceleration would be to Sikorsky can be calculated quite easily using a simplified
net present value (NPV) analysis if the current ramp-up production schedule is known.
In order to illustrate the potential value of ramp-up acceleration, an NPV analysis was done
using the actual predicted production ramp-up schedule and the following arbitrary numbers:
* Margin per helicopter of $500,000
* Annual discount rate of 7%
* Time period of three years with June 2008 as the start date
* Maximum final production capacity of one airframe per month (approximately one-fourth of
Aero's current production capacity).
The results of this analysis, shown in Table 10, show the value of one, three and six month accelerations
of production ramp-up. The benefit in terms of increased margin NPV ranges from $450K for a one
month acceleration to $2.73M for a six month acceleration, due solely to cash flow acceleration.
If these numbers were actual real-world numbers rather than an illustrative scenario, the values
could be used to help determine which improvement opportunities are worth pursuing, by comparing
their cost to their benefit. For example, consider if Sikorsky had believed that co-locating 10 additional
technicians at Changhe for six months would accelerate production ramp-up by three months. Would
that have been an investment worth making? Assuming the cost to Sikorsky of relocating a technician is
equal to 100% of his current fully-loaded cost, and that technicians have a fully-loaded cost of $75K, it
would cost $375K to co-locate 10 technicians at Changhe for six months. Achieving a three month ramp-
up acceleration would yield $1.35M in increased margin NPV, for a net increase in margin NPV of $975K
(assuming the cost of the co-locations is fully recognized up-front). The fact that the margin NPV
increases on net indicates this is an investment Sikorsky should have considered making if it believed it
would have resulted in a three month acceleration in ramp-up of production.
Table 10: Illustrative production ramp-up acceleration analysis results
Production Ramp-up Scenario NPV of Margin Benefit of Ramp-up
($M) Acceleration ($M)
Current actual scenario 7.25 --
1 month acceleration over actual 7.70 0.45
3 month acceleration over actual 8.60 1.35
6 month acceleration over actual 9.98 2.73
1 Whether increased production capacity would result in acceleration of financial revenue recognition or not
depends on when revenue is recognized by Sikorsky. If revenue is fully recognized upon contract signing, increasing
production capacity would not result in acceleration of revenue recognition. But in either case, net cash inflows
would be accelerated. One direct profit impact of this would be a reduced cost of capital.
Accelerating production ramp-up would not only accelerate cash flows to Sikorsky, but would
also reduce Changhe's inventory carrying costs for the first several airframes. An analysis conducted
assuming a 5% cost of capital demonstrates that Changhe's inventory carrying costs per airframe would
decrease by $12,000 per month of ramp-up acceleration (Table 11). Given Changhe's actual inventory
purchasing schedule, ramp-up acceleration would likely have affected carrying costs of the first five
airframes they will produce. So in total, each month of acceleration of production ramp-up would have
resulted in a $60,000 increase in Changhe margin. Given the relatively low margin that Changhe will
make per airframe, savings on this order are actually somewhat significant.
Table 11: Illustrative production ramp-up acceleration analysis results - inventory carrying cost impact
Production ramp-up scenario Inventory Per-airframe
carrying cost per benefit of ramp-up
airframe ($) acceleration ($)
Current actual scenario 161,000 --
1 month acceleration over actual 149,000 12,000
3 month acceleration over actual 124,000 37,000
6 month acceleration over actual 87,000 74,000
Even though Changhe has primary responsibility for bearing inventory carrying costs, Sikorsky
could also benefit from Changhe's savings. As mentioned previously, Sikorsky has agreed to compensate
Changhe approximately $30K per airframe for inventory carrying costs. If Changhe's inventory carrying
costs were lowered, Sikorsky could argue that these payments are no longer necessary. The other
potential benefit to Sikorsky would be accelerated inventory purchasing by Changhe. In an effort to
minimize its inventory carrying costs, Changhe has sometimes delayed component purchases so much
that parts needed for current production have been missing, resulting in production stoppages.
Increased investment of people resources by Sikorsky and the corresponding accelerated production
ramp-up might signal greater buy-in by Sikorsky to Changhe, resulting in higher levels of trust in
Sikorsky's commitment and the program's likelihood of success, which in turn might lead Changhe to
accelerate its purchases of inventory.
After the profit impact of various improvement opportunities has been estimated as in the
illustrative analyses above, it is important to utilize a prioritization framework to help determine in
which order opportunities should be pursued. One way to prioritize is by feasibility. A feasibility
prioritization can be made by ranking each opportunity according to required investment and speed of
implementation in a two-by-two matrix as shown in Figure 11 for some of the opportunities discussed
(Table 12). Opportunities falling in the lower right-hand quadrant of this matrix are the most feasible
opportunities. A second-order prioritization matrix mapping feasibility versus financial impact could
then also be constructed to further guide prioritization decisions.
Table 12: Sample Improvement Opportunities for Sikorsky
Improvement opportunity Estimated cost Estimated time to implement
Better speaker phones $500 1 week
More frequent factory trips $300/person/trip from Shanghai 1 day
to Changhe factory
More senior-level management $7500/person/trip to China 1-3 months
engagement
Rotational programs $40k/person/6 months 1-3 months
Greater risk sharing $250k-$1M 1-3 months
Change in hiring demographics Minimal 3-5 years until significant effect
Co-location of staff $25k/Changhe staff/year 0.5-1 year
$75k/Sikorsky staff/year
Supply base relocation Minimum of $500K/factory setup 3-5 years
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Figure 11: Feasibility-based prioritization matrix for Sikorsky-Changhe improvement opportunities
CHAPTER 5: GENERALIZED APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION
GENERALIZED SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT PROCESS
While the Sikorsky analysis focused on a specific case of a publicly-traded American helicopter
manufacturer's relationship with its state-owned Chinese supplier, much of the learning from Sikorsky
and the other case studies presented, as well as the literature reviewed, is widely applicable across
industries, geographies and specific products. Based on the frameworks and case studies presented
above, a generalized six-step process for managing supplier relationships is presented below and
summarized in Table 13.
1. Determine the appropriate type of supplier relationship
Determining the appropriate type of relationship to develop with a supplier requires two analyses,
one of which reveals the relevant product's architecture and one of which reveals the importance of the
supplier's location.
First, utilizing the concepts of product architecture, a firm should determine the degree to which its
product has an integral architecture. Products having more integral architectures are better supported
by integral supply chains, which require closer supplier relationships. Products with more modular
product architecture can be supported by more modular supply chains, which require less close supplier
relationships.
Next, the strategic importance of a supplier's location should be determined, especially in the case
of foreign suppliers. On the low strategic importance end of the range, a supplier's location may only be
important for providing access to low factor costs (i.e., an "Offshore factory"). On the greater strategic
importance end of the range, a supplier's location may be important for product development and
gathering of market intelligence (i.e., a "Lead factory"). The higher the strategic importance, the more
important close supplier relationships become.
The Supplier Relationship Management framework provides another way of determining
appropriate relationship to develop with suppliers by looking at both the strategic importance of the
supplier and the supplier's potential for contribution to the relationship. Suppliers are mapped in a two-
by-two matrix with these two dimensions to determine what level of supplier relationship management
is optimal (Figure 2, p16).
2. Determine current type of relationship
Once the appropriate type of supplier relationship has been determined, it is important to
understand the current type of relationship that exists between the firm and its supplier. The Supply
Chain Proximity framework can be used to demonstrate how "close" a relationship is along the four
dimensions of supply chain proximity (cultural, geographic, organizational, IT).
The cultural dimension of supply chain proximity is especially important to analyze in the case of
foreign suppliers. When analyzing cultural proximity though, it is important to remember that
nationality is only one aspect of culture. Organizations can vary in culture due to home market
characteristics and individual experiences as well. Hofstede's five dimensions of national cultural
difference is a good framework for analyzing cultural differences due to nationality and their
implications on the business relationship.
To determine cultural differences arising from home market characteristics, firms should start
by determining the level of openness and competition in, maturity of and customer demographics of the
supplier's home market and comparing it to the firm's own home market. Where differences exist,
thought should be given to how they might indicate resulting difference of business behaviors. For
example, suppliers located in markets with high levels of government protection or subsidy may tend to
conduct business with less of a sense of urgency than their customer located in a more open and
competitive market.
Determining cultural differences arising from individual firm experiences requires a firm to
gather information on the supplier's past experiences with similar customers, products or markets and
determine if those might affect how the supplier will approach its relationship with the firm. For
example, negative experiences with previous foreign customers might cause a supplier to be more
cautious in dealing with subsequent foreign customers.
3. Determine current stage of relationship & appropriate type of investments
Insight gained from the previous two steps will be used to develop actions or measures to be
taken. But what types of actions are appropriate is partially dependent on what stage of supplier
relationship management the firm is currently in. The Supplier Relationship Management framework is
useful for this determination. It defines three main stages of supplier relationship management: Out-
supplier management (the process of selecting future suppliers), In-supplier management (the process
of managing on-going supplier relationships) and In-supplier dissolution management (the process of
ending a supplier relationship). Within In-supplier management, there are four types of relationship
management that occur, depending on stage of relationship and strategic importance of the supplier.
The framework considers actions and measures to be "investments" in the relationship, and
describes appropriate types of investments depending on stage of relationship management. For
example, investments by both the customer and supplier which have the effect of indicating
commitment to the project and relationship are more important during Set-up management, the first
stage of In-supplier management, than in other stages of relationship management.
The Supply Chain Proximity is also useful in this step. Its output of relationship "closeness"
provides another way of viewing the current stage of relationship with the supplier and can be used to
paint a picture of an ideal future state of relationship as well, which can also guide thinking about
investment options.
4. Develop a menu of investment options
Once the current stage of supplier relationship management is known, and therefore the most
important type of relationship investments has been determined, the results of the appropriate
relationship type and supply chain proximity analyses can be used to generate a list of potential
investment options. In other words, investment options should be ones that would either help a
supplier achieve its strategic role for the customer or help overcome lack of proximity in a way that is
relevant to the current stage of relationship management. For example, in the case of a supplier that has
lost significant money on a previous collaboration with a similar foreign customer, a new customer
might determine that greater up-front financial risk-sharing on its part during the Set-Up Management
phase is a relationship investment option that might result in faster production ramp-up by the supplier.
Here again, using the Supply Chain Proximity framework can be a useful tool for ensuring that all
aspects of the supplier relationship are considered when developing investment options.
5. Determine attractiveness of various investment options by analyzing their potential financial
impact and feasibility
Once a menu of relationship investment options is determined, they should be analyzed for
expected or potential financial impact. This entails calculating the cost of the each investment and each
investment's expected return. In addition to determining the potential profit increase due to the
investments, estimating the timing of this impact can also be important. Timing of profit improvement
can be incorporated into a financial impact analysis by using some form of NPV calculation.
In addition to affecting calculations of financial impact, understanding the time and costs
required to make and receive a return on investments also helps in determining which options are most
feasible, where feasibility is defined as "ease of implementation."
It is important to differentiate between potential financial impact and feasibility. For example,
recall two of the investment options analyzed in the Sikorsky case study. Co-locating ten Sikorsky
technicians at Changhe for six months would cost approximately $375K and might take six months to
arrange and another six months before the return on investment would be fully realized. In the
illustrative analysis, it was calculated that the financial impact would be on the order of $1.35M dollars.
Installing better conference telephones at Shanghai Sikorsky, on the other hand, would require only a
few hundred dollars investment and could be completed in a week's time. Financial impact of the new
phones is difficult to estimate, and an uncertainty-adjusted estimate of impact would most likely be
lower than $1.35M. So, considering these two options, it would be safe to say that co-location of
technicians would have a greater positive financial impact for Sikorsky, but installation of better phones
would a more feasible option because of the low cost and short lead time necessary for implementation.
6. Select, prioritize and make investments
Once their financial impact and feasibility have been estimated, the firm must determine which
investments options will actually be made, and what the priority of investment is. Use of 2X2 matrices
can be useful for informing both selection and prioritization. A first matrix that ranks on dimensions of
time and cost of implementation, as in Figure 11, can display which options are most feasible. A second
matrix that ranks on dimensions financial impact and feasibility would result in a prioritization based on
attractiveness. Investment options falling in the quadrant of the matrix representing high impact, highly
feasible options should receive highest priority for implementation.
After selection and prioritization of investment options, the firm should begin to make the
investments at the appropriate time.
Table 13: Generalized Process for Supplier Relationship Management
Step Steps for Managing Relevant Analyses/Frameworks Thesis
Sequence Supplier Relationships reference
location (page
Determine the appropriate * Product architecture * 18
type of supplier * Strategic role of factories * 161 relationship 
* Supplier relationship * 16
management
Determine current type of * Supply chain proximity * 21
relationship * Hofstede's five dimensions of * 26
2 national cultural difference
* Home market comparison * 28
* Firm experiences analysis * 29
Determine current stage of * Supplier relationship * 13
3 relationship & appropriate management
type of investments * Supply chain proximity * 21
Develop a menu of * Supply chain proximity * 21
investment options * Results of above analyses * N/A
Determine the * Cost & time for implementation * 59
5 attractiveness of various * NPV of financial impact * 57
investment options
Select, prioritize and make * Feasibility matrix * 59
investments * Attractiveness matrix * 59
When to use
This six-step process for supplier relationship management is useful under a variety of
circumstances and should not be seen as being useful only on a one-off basis. Additionally, the process is
somewhat modular and flexible. Not all six steps will necessarily need to be followed in every instance.
What follows are some circumstances under which the process is useful and guidance about which steps
are most relevant.
Evaluation of potential suppliers. Performing Steps 1 thru 3 of the process will force a firm to
consider which potential suppliers are capable of fulfilling a certain strategic role, what cultural
differences will have to be bridged in working together and what level of investment may be required to
develop a high-performing relationship with a given supplier.
Set-up Management of new suppliers. Following all six steps of the process before initiating a
supplier relationship or as early as possible after the relationship has been formed is highly
recommended. This is because the analysis can be very valuable in informing activities that occur at the
very beginning of the supplier relationship management cycle: contract negotiations, budgeting of time
and people resources, locating of offices, forming of teams, etc. Conducting these activities without
analyzing cultural differences and their impact, for instance, will very likely result in non-optimal
decision making in these areas.
Improvement of supplier performance. The desire to improve the performance of a supplier is
often born out of some dissatisfaction with current performance. There can be any number of reasons
for unsatisfactory performance, including a non-optimal relationship between the customer and
supplier. Performing step two of the process, determining the current type of relationship, can reveal
sources of poor performance that stem from difficulties related to relationship. If such problems are
revealed, Steps 3 through 6 should be followed as a means of improving the relationship with the
supplier.
Change in desired supplier strategic role. As a firm's strategy for a particular market changes, so
might the strategic contribution it expects its suppliers located in that market to make. In this case,
revisiting Step 1 of the process can help a firm to think about how a change in strategy affects the type
of relationship it should have with its suppliers. The results of that analysis may indicate a change in the
type or level of investment a firm should make in a supplier. Steps 2 through 6 of the process can help
the firm make specific decisions about investments.
Ending of supplier relationships. When a firm makes a decision to shift business from one
supplier to another, it should carefully consider how to reduce investments in the existing supplier
relationship in a way that still enables the supplier to perform appropriately during ramp-down. Steps 3
and 4 of the process are useful for this. Step 2 of the process, particularly the cultural differences
analyses, can help a firm predict what difficulties may arise as it begins to lower its level of investment in
that supplier relationship.
CONCLUSION
In today's environment of outsourcing and globalization, excellence in supply chain
management can be a key competitive advantage for manufacturers. Beyond choosing what to buy and
where to buy it from, managing supplier relationships is also a key component of supply chain
management. And managing supplier relationships is not a trivial matter. The optimal relationship for
any one supplier is likely to be different from that for other suppliers a company works with. This is
because the appropriate supplier relationship is dependent on market and operations strategy, product
architecture, geography, culture, organizational characteristics and communication needs. Fortunately,
there are tools a firm can use to effectively manage its supplier relationships by considering all these
factors and informing relationship investment decisions. The supplier relationship management process
detailed in this paper and developed from literature and case studies is one such tool. Application of its
analyses and principles with both existing and future suppliers will help a firm better manage its supplier
relationships.
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